Human territoriality

Its theory and history

Robert David Sack

Introduction

Human territoriality is a powerful and pervasive element in our lives, but serious scholarship has only skirted its perimeters. This book attempts to help redirect research towards the core of territoriality by conceiving of it as an often indispensable means to power at all levels: from the personal to the international. Since the subject is vast and the uses of territoriality so varied, I can do no more in a single volume than offer a sketch and hope that the picture will serve to stimulate further research. In order to prepare the reader for the approach taken in this book, I would like to say a few words about the contexts in which I think a fruitful discussion of territoriality does and does not belong.

Perhaps the most well-publicized statements on human territoriality have come from biologists and social critics who conceive of it as an offshoot of animal behavior. These writers argue that territoriality in humans is part of an aggressive instinct that is shared with other territorial animals. The view presented in this book is quite different. Although I see territoriality as a basis of power, I do not see it as part of an instinct, nor do I see power as essentially aggressive. The power that a parent exercises over a child may be for the child's good, and that power may or may not be territorial. A parent may decide it is safer to keep the child indoors and away from the wet and cold of the rain. Keeping the child at home, as we shall see, is a territorial restraint. It may be a convenient strategy, but it is not the only means of keeping the child warm and dry. The parent could allow the child to play outside if he is well bundled up in warm rain gear.

Humans can use territoriality for a variety of often abstract reasons, few if any of which are motivations for animals. In fact, because territoriality in humans supposes a control over an area or space that must be conceived of and communicated, one can argue that territoriality in this sense is quite unlikely in most if not all animals. Territoriality in humans is best understood as a spatial strategy to affect, influence, or control resources and people, by controlling area; and, as a strategy, territoriality can be turned on

and off. In geographical terms it is a form of spatial behavior. The issue then is to find out under what conditions and why terrioriality is or is not employed.

This book will examine human territoriality in the context of human motivation. But there remains the fact that the popular image of territoriality is drawn from works emphasizing biological links. Thus the efforts at drawing attention away from such a connection can be confounded by using a term that connotes them. Despite such drawbacks to the term territoriality (and that it is not a pretty sounding word), I have not been able to find a better one. Sovereignty, property, and jurisdiction are too restricted in scope to be suitable alternatives. Although an awkward term, I will use territoriality and trust that its former connotations will not draw attention away from what I believe to be its true signification: *a human strategy to affect, influence, and control.*

Territoriality in humans is best thought of not as biologically motivated, but rather as socially and geographically rooted. Its use depends on who is influencing and controlling whom and on the geographical contexts of place, space, and time. Territoriality is intimately related to how people use the land, how they organize themselves in space, and how they give meaning to place. Clearly these relationships change, and the best means of studying them is to reveal their changing character over time. Territoriality thus lies squarely within two geographical traditions: social geography and historical geography. We can of course claim that these are really interconnected and form a single approach – a social–historical one. Whereas few would deny that the two should be linked, and some have been able to incorporate both traditions in their work, it is not easy to combine both to everyone's satisfaction. The problem centers on the complex differences between the particularistic approaches of historical geography and the generalizing approaches of social geography and its theoretical component – spatial analysis. The differences between the particular and the general are confronted over again in the rest of social science.

Historical geography, which is closely allied with history, tends to undertake detailed examinations of places at certain periods. It may employ generalizations from social geography and other social sciences and it may arrive at general descriptions of people and society, but its primary focus is an understanding of the particular relationships that pertained at a particular place during a particular period. It is often 'long' on facts and descriptions, but 'short' on theory. In terms of the philosophy of geography, it tends to be 'ideographic.' Social geography (and its most generalizing component – spatial analysis), on the other hand, is closely allied to such systematic social sciences as economics, sociology, and political science, and tends to form abstract models of social–geographical relations and to test them usually in contemporary settings, though occasionally data from the past are

used. In geographic terminology these approaches are called 'nomothetic.'

Clearly these can be conceived of as forming a continuum, and thus they need not in principle represent very different approaches. History and historical geography can use socal theories and help reformulate them, and social theories can be made more precise and pertinent under the scrutiny of historians. Yet in practice – due perhaps to personal preferences in research, to styles of analysis, to gaps between fact and theory – the continuum has been a bit thin in the middle. Historians and historical geographers often criticize systematic social science models as a-historical and claim that when the models are tested on the past, we learn very little about the period because these over-generalized models, rather than the historical contexts, select the facts to be explained. Social geographers and social scientists counter that many historical geographers and historians are too unwilling to generalize and to accept the fact that even detailed descriptions must be based on generalizations about behavior and about the past. And of course, when one tries to bridge these differences by practicing in the middle of the continuum, one runs the risk of not satisfying either end.

So it is within the tradition of human geography, and somewhere between the traditions of social and historical analysis, that this work on territoriality lies. The following contains both theory and history with perhaps a heavier emphasis on the former because my training has been in the spatial-analytic part of social geography. By theory I do not mean the full-blown positivistic conception of a series of nomothetic relationships linked together axiomatically and which can be used to predict human actions. Rather by theory I mean an interrelated group of characteristics which can be used to explain or make sense of behavior. This more flexible meaning is intended to suggest less than the positivistic ideal, but more than just some loosely connected notions. An important characteristic of territorial theory is that it is designed to disclose potential reasons for using territoriality. Which ones are used in fact depend on the actual context. Some of the reasons or effects will be used in practically any situation, and others will be used only under particular contexts. In this respect, the theory is phrased generally or abstractly drawing on social structure, but its specification and exemplification depends on particular historical context and on individual agency. The purpose of the book is not simply to test, exemplify, or illustrate generalizations. It is hoped that the book will also deepen our understanding of certain historical contexts by demonstrating how and why territoriality is used. Territoriality can shed light especially on the rise of civilization and on critical facets of modernity.

Territoriality then is an historically sensitive use of space, especially since it is socially constructed and depends on who is controlling whom and why. It is the key geographical component in understanding how society and space are interconnected. In exploring these issues, the book not only uses the past

to illustrate the theory but also reconstructs parts of the history of territoriality in order to shed more light on past and present social organizations. But in combining theory and history, the book makes no pretense at disclosing new historical facts or sources. Rather it attempts to place old and well-known facts in a different light.

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The meaning of territoriality

Territoriality for humans is a powerful geographic strategy to control people and things by controlling area. Political territories and private ownership of land may be its most familiar forms but territoriality occurs to varying degrees in numerous social contexts. It is used in everyday relationships and in complex organizations. Territoriality is a primary geographical expression of social power. It is the means by which space and society are interrelated. Territoriality's changing functions help us to understand the historical relationships between society, space, and time.

This book explores some of the more important changes that have occurred in the relationships between society and territoriality, from the beginning of history to the present. It does so by analyzing the possible advantages and disadvantages that territoriality can provide, and considering why some and not others arise only at historical periods. Exploring the advantages and disadvantages leads us to the theory of territoriality. Exploring when and why these come to the fore constitutes the history of territoriality and its changing relationships to space and society.

The history of territoriality and territoriality's relationship to space and society are informed by the theoretically possible advantages that territoriality can be expected to provide. After introducing the meaning of territoriality in this chapter we will explore in Chapter 2 the theoretically possible advantages of territoriality. The subsequent chapters will consider how and when these advantages are used historically and the effects they have on social organization. Chapter 3 will sketch the major changes in the relationships between territory and society from primitive times to the present and focus on the most important periods: the rise of civilization and the rise of capitalism. Chapter 4 will analyze the pre-modern development of territoriality within a complex organization – the Catholic Church. Chapters 5 and 6 will consider the development of territoriality in the modern period: Chapter 5 will explore the rise of the four-hundred-year-old political territorial organization of North America; Chapter 6 will explore the

development of territoriality within work environments for the same span of time.

These periods and contexts are selected to illustrate the most important historical developments in the uses of territoriality. They will permit us to see that some territorial effects are universal, occurring in practically any historical context and social organization, that others are specific to particular historical periods and organizations, and that only modern society tends to use the entire range of possible effects. Exploring how modern society employs this range and especially why it employs territorial effects that were not of use to pre-modern societies, will help to unravel the meanings and implications of modernity and the future role of territoriality.

Examples of territoriality

Before we consider territoriality's theory and history, we must first describe what it is and what it does. To familiarize ourselves with the range of our subject, let us sketch territorial uses in three contexts. The first concerns the Chippewa Indians of North America and their contact with Europeans and serves to illustrate differences in territorial uses between pre-modern and modern societies. The second concerns territoriality in the modern home and the third considers territoriality in the modern work place. Both explore contemporary territorial uses in familiar small-scale contexts and point to the ubiquity of territoriality in modern life.

The Chippewa

Consider the group of American Indians, called the Chippewa (Ojibwe), who, in the early days of European contact, occupied a large area surrounding the western half of Lake Superior.[1] The Chippewa belong to the Algonkuian language group which covered much of the north central and north eastern sections of the United States and the south central and eastern portions of Canada. There were well over 20,000 Chippewa at the time of first European contact. Although the Chippewa possessed a common language, culture, and system of beliefs, they did not possess a central political organization. They were more of a collection of bands than a 'tribe.'

The Chippewa were primarily hunters, gatherers, and collectors. They lived on berries, nuts, roots, wild rice, fish, and game. Those who lived in the south and west portions of Lake Superior in areas having approximately 100 frost-free days or more per year were able to supplement their diets by cultivating corn and squash. Their material artifacts included canoes, bows and arrows, spears, traps, and baskets; and their shelters ranged from wooden tepee-like constructions to leantos and dugouts. Some within the

community were better able than others to make these artifacts, but knowledge of how to construct them was available to all. Those who had superior abilities were looked upon as leaders. Leadership was earned. A leader would not impose his decision on his people and could not prevent a person from obtaining a livelihood. In economic terms, these people were egalitarian.

The size of Chippewa social units beyond the family varied seasonally. During the spring, summer, and early autumn, when berries, roots, wild rice, and fish were readily at hand and the larger game were plentiful, families would gather together to form a village of perhaps 100 to 150 people. During the winter months, when food was scarce, the families would normally disperse into smaller units, with an individual household occasionally going it alone. Even though single families could survive a season by themselves, they were rarely out of reach of others during the winter, and in the warmer months reconstituted their villages to undertake those numerous cultural and economic activities that required sustained cooperation. When together, band members hunted, gathered, and shared their produce. Friendships were established and marriages planned. Membership in bands seems to have been voluntary. If tensions arose, or if needs changed, a family could leave one band and join another.

What can be said about Chippewa territorial organization? It is clear that as an entity the Chippewa occupied a vast area. But their habitation was never clearly bounded and fluctuated from year to year. On the east the Chippewa were interspersed among the closely related and friendly Ottawa and Potawatomi; in the north they were intermingled among the normally friendly Cree; in the west with more Cree, and Assiniboin.[2] The Chippewa had their greatest difficulty with the eastern and prairie Dakota who were along their southern and western frontiers. But a large tract of unoccupied no-man's land provided a buffer zone between them and their Dakota neighbors. Even if the perimeter of the Chippewa 'nation' had been stable, it is doubtful that it would have been circumambulated by a single Chippewa, or that many among them would possess a map-like representation of their collective domains.[3]

Chippewa bands, too, occupied particular areas, but their sites shifted after several years as did their social compositions. A band's encampment at a particular site and its use of the resources of the surrounding area must have been known and accepted by neighboring bands. But this does not mean that a band needed to claim a specific territory exclusively for its own use and defend it against incursions by other Chippewas. Population was sparse enough and food abundant enough so that when a band used an area it is unlikely it would be to the exclusion of confreres. Individuals and families within these egalitarian bands did not themselves 'own' land. The land was the community's to use, and band members were allowed to share

in its use. A band could apportion part of an area to a particular family, but this did not mean the family owned the land or excluded others from it. This applies to the use of land for agriculture as well as for hunting and gathering.

The growing season north of the Great Lakes was too short for the Chippewas there to practice agriculture, but south and west of Lake Superior the cultivation of corn and squash formed an important supplement to Chippewa diet. These Indians had their fields nearby their villages. Each family may have had its own garden which it cleared, planted, and tended alone, or the process may have been collective. In any case these gardens were not clearly demarcated and fenced-in territories.

At the time of European contact, then, these people were hardly territorial as a 'nation,' although they may have been occasionally territorial as individual bands or as families within bands. Yet even here their assertion of control over an area was often imprecise, seasonal, and strategic. Bands or families may have laid claim to an area only if they were reasonably confident that the resources they were after would be there and if they knew there would be competition for these resources from other groups. Imagining these very conditions to predominate allows us to consider how a group 'such as' the Chippewas might alter and intensify their territorial use. We say 'such as' because some of the factors we will consider, although important causes of changes in territorial use in other pre-literate societies, and although present in Chippewa society, were not in fact the primary ones to alter Chippewa territorial use. Yet entertaining them as possibilities will help us understand how in general a simple pre-literate society can develop primarily internal pressures to alter relationships between territoriality and social organization.

In this vein suppose that game becomes scarcer and for those Chippewa in the south more time must be devoted to agriculture. Suppose also that for some in Minnesota and Wisconsin the horse becomes part of their culture. Members of the community may still collectively clear the fields, plant, and tend crops, but how are these now vital crops to be protected from the wild animals, from the very young children, and from the horses? It is possible that these are minor difficulties and that no special precautions are needed. The threat from wild animals may be negligible; the adults can closely supervise the children and their access to the crops; and the horses may find enough grass to graze on so that they will not forage in the gardens. But it could also be the case that even if these are not serious problems, the community finds it more convenient either to fence off the fields or to fence in the horses, or both. The purposes of these clear territorial demarcations would be to establish different degrees of access to things in space. Yet little else need change. The community may still maintain its original goals.

But it is not difficult to have our imaginations go a step further to consider conditions of greater crowding, making unavoidable more complex ter-

ritorial partitions within the band. The size of the community itself may grow to the point where casual community work efforts become unmanageable, and population pressure from other groups may make it impossible for a family simply to leave one band for another. Even though the community may still be egalitarian – even though the land is still the community's – the fields may now be allocated to families on the basis of need, and family plots may have to be demarcated and access restricted simply to prevent inadvertent trampling. The possibilities for territoriality can multiply within this egalitarian society. But there is a point at which some of these possibilities may actually interfere with the values of community sharing and cooperation. This is not to say that different uses of territoriality alone can transform social relations from, in this case, an egalitarian to a class structured society. But territoriality can be a catalyst in the process of change and can be used differently and to as much advantage by a class divided as by an egalitarian society. If for example a Chippewa ruling family were to emerge claiming access to some or all of the community's resources, territoriality would be an extremely useful device to affect its claims.

These speculations point to the possibility of territorial changes occurring largely from forces within the society. Such transformations have in fact been documented for several pre-literate societies and will be examined more closely in a subsequent chapter. But for the Chippewa, most of the social and territorial transformations were imposed upon them by European and American economy and polity.

The European fur trade soon strained social relationships within the bands. It strained egalitarian and communal efforts. It affected hunting habits and an ecology of the area, and it may have increased individual and family territorial control at the expense of communal access. But the adoption of private property was selective. Some have claimed that as a result of the fur trade individual families among Woodland Indian tribes, including the Chippewa, appeared to own hunting grounds that were passed down from father to son. But upon close inspection of the evidence it seems that private territorial control may have been exercised only over access to furs and not to other resources. According to Leacock these hunting territories, at least for the Montagnais, 'did not involve true land ownership. One could not trap near another's line, but anyone could hunt game animals, could fish, or could gather wood, berries, or birchbark on another's grounds as long as these products of the land were for use, and not for sale.'[4]

European settlement east of the Alleghenys also increased population pressure throughout the upper Mid-West as tribes moved farther west to find new land. Population pressure and reliance on trade further strained communal social-territorial relationships of bands; many families became both dependent on and skillful in the fur trade. This adaptation actually helped extend the Chippewa domain until by the 1840s Chippewa settlement

Figure 1.1 Colonial land grants, 1603–1732

Source: Atlas of the Historical Geography of the United States, ed. Charles O. Paullin and J. K. Wright (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1932).

covered the areas of western Lake Superior, east to the shores of Lake Huron, north practically to the shores of Hudson Bay, west to Lake Winnipeg, and south to central Minnesota and Wisconsin.

But the most far reaching effect on Chippewa social and territorial organization came from the imposition by the Europeans of hierarchical and territorial political jurisdiction. Unbeknownst to the Chippewas and to the original colonizers, the early English grants and charters forming the territorial units of the colonies (as seen in Figure 1.1) made claim to much of the Chippewa area.

The Virginia Charter of 1609 itself encompassed the entire upper Mid-West. But these early claims were not enforceable. From the mid-seventeenth century to the mid-eighteenth, the upper Mid-West was nominally under French control until it was signed over to the English and their colonies in 1763. Shortly thereafter, Virginia, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New York made claims to parts of this land. High among the priorities of the First Congress of the United States was the disposition and government of the North West Territory: the approximately 170 million acres west of the Ohio to the Mississippi. By 1786, and after much wrangling, the claimants had ceded all of these lands to the United States, and a series of ordinances, based on Thomas Jefferson's 1783–4 proposal, and culminating in the ordinances of 1787 and 1796, provided procedures for the governance of this territory. The plan, illustrated by areas 1–5 in Figure 1.2, was to divide the North West into not less than three and no more than five states and to admit each into the Union once it had a population of 60,000. In addition the land would be surveyed according to a regular rectangular grid, the units of which would help delineate state boundaries, form the entire boundaries for counties and townships, and boundaries of saleable parcels of land[5] (see Figure 1.3).

These were plans, written and mapped out on paper, for a land virtually unknown to Europeans, and which, at its farthest reach, was over 1,000 miles from the Eastern Seaboard where the decisions were being made. With the stroke of a pen, Americans of European descent were to classify, divide, and control people, including Chippewas, solely on the basis of their location in space. This imposition of territory had both a social and an economic dimension. At the social level a national, state, or local boundary could apportion a society among a number of jurisdictions. The political units to which the Chippewas belonged changed frequently as the territorial map of the North West took shape. Eventually part of the Chippewa were to be in Canada, another part in Minnesota, another in Michigan, and yet another in Wisconsin.

With the exception of reservations, most of the Chippewa land within the United States was sold as private parcels lying within particular territories or states, and after the states were admitted into the Union, the political

Figure 1.2 Jefferson–Hartley map (1783) of proposed states

Reproduced by permission of the William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan.

territorial partitioning continued along county and township lines, further subdividing and segmenting former Indian lands. These local units formed political communities for non-reservation Indians as well as for European settlers. The reservations were 'permanent' territorial molds containing land that Europeans found least desirable. As though retaliating against this territorially imposed restriction on Indian culture, the boundaries of reservations often formed an impediment to the neat geometric symmetry of neighboring townships, cutting through the rectangular land survey and interrupting the domains of local authority.

These newly imposed political territories (national, state, county, and township) were designed to serve the needs of the white man's market-oriented society. While the imposed boundaries segmented older communities, they forged newer and different ones geared to a dynamic market system. And within this system territorial partitioning became a primary vehicle for defining property. Unlike the aboriginal Indian's communal use of land, the white man used territory to partition land into saleable parcels. Each piece of private property was a territory under the control of an individual. Each had a monetary value and each could be bought and sold again and again.

The different functions that white men and Indians gave to territoriality

Abstract system of township and application to a portion of the Upper Mississippi drainage basin


Figure 1.3 United States rectangular land survey

Source: Hildegard B. Johnson, *Order upon the Land* (Oxford, 1976). Reproduced by permission of the Delegates of Oxford University Press.

Residential Districts

R L Low-density (less than 8 units/acre)
R LM Low-medium density (8-15 units/acre)
R M Medium density (16-25 units/acre)
R MH Medium-high density (26-40 units/acre)
R H High density (41-60 units/acre)

-S Single-unit district
-X Mixed housing types district
-M Multi-unit housing district

ND Neighborhood design districts

Commercial Districts

CN Neighborhood commercial
CC Community commercial
CR Regional commercial
CH Highway commercial
CC-X Mixed-use district (suffix ''-X'')

Industrial Districts

I

SI Special Institutional Districts

P Parks, recreation, open space, conservancy

Other Symbols Used on Maps

School locations
⑤ Other parks and recreation facilities
◄

Figure 1.4 Land use map for portion of Madison, WI (1978)

sheds light on their long troubled relationship. But it also serves to illustrate how the establishment and uses of territory are intermeshed with social-historical contexts. The accurate lines on political maps and land surveys of the white man were possible to construct because his society was literate and capable of printing, surveying, and determining longitude and latitude. But more fundamental is the fact that these territories were created and used to support his complex hierarchical society which was based on private property and which used territory to define and organize its own membership. In contrast to a Chippewa, who was born into a Chippewa community and was accepted socially and culturally by the Chippewa people, a Wisconsinite was simply someone who resided within the boundaries of Wisconsin. In modern Western culture, simply living within a territory often enables one to be a member of a community.

The areas once occupied by migrating Chippewa bands are now virtual mazes of nested and overlapping hierarchies of political, quasi-political, and private territories (see Figure 1.4). Although not always visible on the ground they have precise and fixed boundaries specified in maps and documents and affect numerous segments of our lives. Simply by being located at one moment in place 'x,' say an upper Mid-Western city, one is either on a piece of public or private property. In either case, one is automatically grouped along with others in the same location as being situated within the jurisdiction of police district 'a,' fire district 'b,' sanitation district 'c,' school district 'd,' planning district 'e,' state court district 'f,' federal court district 'g,' the city of 'h,' the county of 'i,' and the state of 'z.' Shift your position just the slightest bit and you will change your relationship to one or more of these units as well as your relationship to others.

Establishing political jurisdiction and delimiting private ownership of land are the most familiar uses of territoriality in the Western World. However, territoriality has and continues to play important roles in other aspects of social relations. Let us briefly consider two modern examples: territoriality within the home and within the work place. Each can be used to specify further territoriality's meaning and illustrate its interconnections to social contexts.

The home

Consider a twentieth-century North American parent who is a property owner on former Chippewa land. He is at home, doing housework and minding his two very young children. As the parent is dusting and vacuuming it dawns on him that the children are in the kitchen 'helping' to wash the dishes. The difficulty is that the well-intentioned young helpers are perilously close to dropping the plates. Their activities are taking place in space. In geographic terms, they are 'spatial.' Although the surroundings

are different, the parent is presented with a problem that is much like the one the Chippewa parents would have faced if they had been concerned that their children would trample the fields. Geographically speaking the North American (and the Chippewa) parent has only two strategies to prevent disaster. He can have a face to face, heart to heart, talk with the children, thanking them for their efforts but explaining that there may be difficulties if they continue. He might also remove the dishes from their reach. (The Chippewa parent could not have removed the plants.) In either undertaking the parent is attempting to control the spatial actions of his children, and what they have access to in space, by focussing on the specific objects of the actions, like the dishes (or the plants).

The intent is to alter the children's access to things in space but, in the above, territoriality is not being invoked. Territoriality, as the second strategy, is brought to bear when the parent decides simply to restrict the children's access to things in space by telling them 'they may not go into the kitchen without permission' (or that they may not enter the fields unsupervised). That is, the kitchen (or the field) is now 'off limits.' Here the parent is attempting to limit the children's access to things by asserting *control over an area.*

Notice that the kitchen (or the field) is there all the time. It is a bounded place. In the non-territorial case it simply was not demarcated as an area of control. In the second case it was. In other words, a place can be a territory at one time and not at another, and a territory can create a place where one did not before exist. Moreover, the assertion of territoriality may apply only for a limited time. The modern parent may have said 'don't go into the kitchen *now* while I am vacuuming.' Or the territorial restrictions can be lifted when the objects the parent wishes to protect are now in the cupboard 'out of reach.'

The kitchen is imbedded in other places that are also territories; the house, the city, the state. The authority of these territories was not directly invoked in this case, but was in the background and could be drawn upon in other situations that could arise even in the kitchen. Note also that declaring the kitchen to be off limits to the children and enforcing the assertion is not the end of the matter. The parents' assertions have to be stated clearly to the children, they must be able to understand them, and their behavior has still to be monitored. All of these tasks involve further behavior in space. Using territoriality may help reduce some types of spatial interactions, the amount of monitoring, and the destruction of plates. But if the assertions of territorial control cannot fail, then the alternative is a non-territorial 'spatial' strategy. If the children persist in entering the kitchen and touching the plates, the parent may physically have to remove the children. In geographic terms, territoriality is a form of spatial interaction that influences other spatial interactions, and requires non-territorial actions to back it up.

Within the context of child rearing and the home, the aboriginal Chippewa and the North American parent would possess similar choices about the role of territoriality. But the choices are quite different in the context of work. Most people in North America now work in a place that is under someone else's control.

The work place

Suppose that the same North American parent is employed as a secretary in a modern office building. Typically these places contain large rooms filled with desks and typewriters. Each desk is designed as a 'work station.' The secretary is employed to type, and part of the working agreement is that he be in the office at his desk for a specified number of hours per day, five days a week, fifty weeks a year. The modern secretary may leave the work station. But if he does so often and without permission he may be in violation of the work agreement and stand to lose his job. Even if the secretary is permitted to leave his work station his movements within the buildings are likely to be restricted. He cannot simply wander into any office. Perhaps the only areas to which he is free to go are those designed for 'traffic' such as hallways and corridors, and those open to 'workers' such as lavatories and coffee rooms. For the secretary, territoriality acts as a physical restraint.

After work hours, say five p.m., the territorial functions of the building become 'inverted.' The secretary leaves for home and instead of restraining and molding his actions, the building is now off limits to him and to the public. Present at day but dissolved at night are the internal territorial partitions of offices and work stations that separated workers and levels of personnel. The building may still be occupied, but this time by janitors and night watchmen who, unlike all but the highest levels of management, have access to practically every part of the building.

More eventful changes can occur in the territoriality of the office building. The firm using the building may move or go bankrupt and the building itself may be demolished. More far reaching in its geographical effects is the possibility that with modern tele-communications systems the office as a territory may become obsolete because much if not all of the secretary's work can be done in any place, even in the home. This may make it unnecessary for people to gather in one place called the office. Yet this does not eliminate work territories entirely. There still needs to be restricted access to the place where work and equipment will be located, even if that is in the house, and employers may very well have to enter the house to check on the worker and the equipment he is using. What has changed is the form of territorial organization and its relationships to non-territorial spatial relations.

Notes on meanings

It is clear from these examples that territoriality covers a wide range of activities for which there are often other perhaps more richly descriptive names. Calling rooms, buildings, property rights in land, political sovereignty, and legal jurisdictions over area, as well as roads and cities, 'territories,' serves no purpose unless the term enhances our understanding of these particulars. Viewing familiar activities as territorial should add to our understanding of them. This means that territoriality must be defined broadly enough to cover these and other cases and yet richly enough to illuminate its different effects. We need to know not only what territoriality is, but what it does. It is principally on helping to point to the important effects of a phenomenon that the value of a definition rests.

A definition is never all inclusive. It focusses on one or a few of a phenomenon's characteristics. A phenomenon that contains these characteristics fits the definition, yet it will also possess many other characteristics, and can go by other names as well. A statue can be a work of art, an investment, a record of a human likeness, a piece of marble, and a mass. Each in its turn contributes to our understanding of the statue's uses and effects. An apple, too, is many things, most of which are different from the statue. But the two have things in common. They both take up space, and they both have weight or mass. Knowing what their masses are means that mass is clearly enough defined so that it can be observed in even very different types of phenomena.

But a concept or term needs to be more than clear. It needs to point to connections with other attributes. In this sense mass is not only a clear concept but a useful one.[6] Knowing the mass of an object can tell us much about the phenomenon's actual and potential connections with its environment. We would know for instance how strong a floor must be to support the statue and the apple. We would be able to anticipate the impact each would have if dropped from a two story window. Knowing the mass of something broadens our understanding of it and its connections to the world. But by no means does it tell us all there is to know about the object and its interrelationships. The statue and the apple are both masses. But they exhibit many other clearly definable and significant attributes which they do not share and which cannot be disclosed by viewing them as instances of mass.

The same applies to territoriality. It is one thing to define territoriality clearly so that a room, a home, a field, an office, and a city are seen to be instances of territoriality. It is another to have our understanding of these phenomena and their interrelationships deepened by examining them as territories. The latter condition occurs only if our meaning of territoriality is clear and rich enough to suggest how it is joined with other facets of behavior.

Defining territoriality

Territoriality, as simply 'the control of area,' has served so far as a shortened definition. But this description is neither precise nor rich enough to take us much farther. From our examples of the parent and the children, the secretary in the work place, and the members of the hunting–gathering society, it can be seen that territoriality involves the attempt by an individual or group to influence or affect the actions of others including non-humans. It is this important yet general effect that must be emphasized and which is elaborated in the following formal definition of territoriality. In this book territoriality will be defined as *the attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area.* This area will be called the *territory.* Before we explore the significance of this definition, some further clarification of its domain is in order.[7]

Once again, it should be emphasized that a place can be used as a territory at one time and not at another; that is, in creating a territory we are also creating a kind of place. But it is important to distinguish between a territory as a place and other types of places. Unlike many ordinary places, territories require constant effort to establish and maintain.[8] They are the results of strategies to affect, influence, and control people, phenomena, and relationships. Circumscribing things in space, or on a map, as when a geographer delimits an area to illustrate where corn is grown, or where industry is concentrated, identifies places, areas, or regions in the ordinary sense, but does not by itself create a territory. This delimitation becomes a territory only when its boundaries are used to affect behavior by controlling access. For instance a formerly ordinary geographical place or region such as a corn belt or a manufacturing area may become designated by the government as a region to receive special financial assistance or as an area to be administered by a special branch of government. In this case the boundaries of the region are affecting access to resources and power. They are molding behavior and thus the place becomes a territory. By the same token, what geographers call nodal regions, market areas, or central place hinterlands are not necessarily territories. They can be simply descriptions of the geographic extent of activities in space. They become territories though if the boundaries are used by some authority to mold, influence, or control activities. Thus a chain of supermarkets may use market areas – the actual geographic limit of the drawing power of a supermarket – to define each supermarket manager's jurisdiction (i.e. his responsibilities for advertising).[9] A person or group can of course control more than one territory, and in modern society, many ordinary kinds of places must become territorial to exist as places.

Territoriality need not be defended area, if by that is meant that the area itself is the object of defense, and that the defender(s) must be within the

territory defended. Territory can be used to contain or restrain as well as to exclude, and the individuals who are exercising control need not be inside the territory. Indeed, they need not be anywhere near it. A fence or wall can control, so too can a 'no trespass' sign. The definition points out that territoriality establishes control over area as a means of controlling access to things and relationships.

Territoriality is a strategy to establish different degrees of access to people, things, and relationships. Its alternative is always non-territorial action, and non-territorial action is required in any case to back it up. For example if the Chippewa decide to fence in their gardens, these fences must be maintained by direct physical labor; and if they should break, the children and the horses must be watched and guarded by direct non-territorial control. (If the children in the modern home continue to enter the kitchen even if the parent told them *not to*, then the parent will have to resort to a non-territorial form of intervention.)

Both the boundaries of a territory and the means by which they are communicated are not unalterable. Land holdings change size. So too do nation states. A boundary fence may be replaced by one of a different type such as a ditch. A child may recognize a threshold to a room as a boundary, or else have the door to the room closed. Most territories tend to be fixed in geographical space, but some can move. For instance the personal space or social distance surrounding a person travels with that person when he maintains the distance. The convention among ships of war not to come too near foreign naval vessels in the high seas is an example of a movable territory.

Territories can occur in degrees. A cell in a maximum-security prison is more territorial than a cell in a country jail, which is more territorial than a room in a half-way house. A closed classroom, with its desks anchored to the floor and its children seated all day at their desks, is more territorial than an open classroom which has no fixed seats for each child and that allows the children to move about from one activity to another. Degrees of territoriality are far more difficult to compare when selecting examples from different institutions and societies. Are activities of an automobile worker on an assembly line more territorially circumscribed than those of an office secretary in a secretarial pool? The finer points of measuring the intensity of territoriality will be addressed later on. For now it should be borne in mind that although we can make rough estimates of territorial intensity, difficulties arise when comparing one context with another.

Territoriality can be asserted in a number of ways. These include job descriptions (how long you must be seated, where you are and are not allowed to go, etc.), legal rights in land, brute force or power, cultural norms and prohibitions about the use of areas, and subtler forms of communication such as body posture. But once again, if the assertion is not clear and

understandable then it is unclear whether territoriality is being exercised.

Definitions should be clear enough to point out that something does or does not fit the definition. But even a clear definition has fuzzy edges in practice. If I am in a library and place my books on an empty table, am I simply relieving myself of a burden or claiming a part of the table as mine? And if the latter, am I asserting control over an object, the table, or over a territory that the object circumscribes? There is no harm in admitting that borderline cases occur which can go either way. A definition can have some exceptions or fuzzy parts and still be useful especially when there are innumerable clear-cut examples that fall within its domain.

Considering territoriality as a strategy for differential access side steps the fruitless issue of whether human territoriality is in any sense biologically rooted.[10] By making it a strategy it places territoriality entirely within the context of human motivations and goals. Our definition of territoriality indeed cuts across perspectives and levels of analysis. It involves the perspectives of those controlled and those doing the controlling, whether they be individuals or groups. It draws upon physical, social, and psychological effects. This cross-cutting of other fields is not new to geography and is paralleled by the range of interconnections that have been developed in the rest of the field.[11]

The significance of territoriality

The formal definition of territoriality not only tells us what territoriality is but it suggests what it can do. This suggestion comes from three interdependent relationships which are contained in its definition. These three disclose the logic and significant effects of territoriality. First, by definition, territoriality must involve a form of classification by area. When someone says that anything, or even some things, in this room are his, or are off limits to you, or that you may not touch anything outside this room, he is using area to classify or assign things to a category such as his, or not yours. He need not define or enumerate the kinds of things that are his or are not yours. When using territoriality, the parent did not have to tell the children what they should not touch. They were simply not allowed in the room. According to Piaget, there are only two major forms of classification.[12] One is by type and the other is by area. Territoriality indeed can employ both but it always employs the latter.

Second, by definition, territoriality must contain a form of communication. This may involve a marker or sign such as is commonly found in a boundary. Or a person may create a boundary through a gesture such as pointing. A territorial boundary may be the only symbolic form that combines a statement about direction in space and a statement about possession or exclusion.

Third, each instance of territoriality must involve an attempt at enforcing control over access to the area and to things within it, or to things outside of it by restraining those within. More generally, each instance must involve an attempt at influencing interactions: transgressions of territoriality will be punished and this can involve other non-territorial and territorial action.

The logic of territoriality rests on the fact that the advantages of using it must be linked with one or more of these interconnected relationships. Because they are essential facets of territoriality the three must also be the basis for the significance of territoriality. It is simple to illustrate how each can be a reason for using territoriality. Consider the first characteristic: that territoriality involves a form of definition or classification by area. Definition by area can be extremely useful when either we cannot enumerate things, people or relationships we want to have access to, or when we wish not to divulge such a list. A football team practicing new plays before the big game may not want the opponents to know about them. To help keep them secret, the coach may use territoriality to exclude observers from the field and stands.

Consider the second characteristic: communicating by using a boundary. The boundary may be a simpler device for communicating possession than enumeration by kind. If the children in the kitchen are very young, they may have difficulty understanding which objects in the kitchen they are or are not allowed to touch. Territoriality may be the only means of conveying the parent's wishes to the children. This is especially the case if elsewhere and under different circumstances the children also are allowed to touch similar types of objects like dishes. Instead of presenting the children with a complicated rule about when handling dishes is not permissible, it is simply more direct to tell them they may not cross beyond this line, or enter/leave this room.

Consider the third characteristic: enforcement of access, in the context of the hunting Chippewa community. To make sure that the children would not trample the fields, it may be easier to fence in the children than to follow them around. Similar circumstances occur in our society. It is easier to supervise convicts by placing them behind bars than by allowing them to roam about with guards following them. Controlling things territorially may save effort.

These three facets of territoriality can be found in all societies, but they, in turn, generate further potential effects that can be equally important but which occur only in particular historical contexts. How this happens, and what the effects are, is somewhat technical and will be discussed at length in Chapter 2. For purposes of illustration, we can point out that by classifying at least in part by area rather than by kind or type, territoriality can help relationships become impersonal and can help mold future activities within a hierarchy. We noted that the Chippewa did not need to use territoriality to

define their members, but the white man did. The primary definition of membership within a North American state or city is domicile within the political territory. This definition allows complete strangers to become members of the same community. Moreover, unlike the Chippewa community, the territory of the city acts as a container and as a spatial mold for other events. A city's influence and authority, although spreading far and wide, is legally assigned to its political boundaries. The territorial city becomes the object to which other attributes are assigned, as in the case of the political territory of the city being the unit receiving federal aid.

Fostering impersonal relationships and geographically molding activities within a hierarchy are but two of many identifiable consequences of the three facets of territoriality which follow from its definition. These and the others will be framed broadly enough in Chapter 2 to encompass the range of territorial uses and yet precisely enough to deepen our understanding of particular cases. The effects are potential because each one need not be employed in every instance of territoriality, and some have been used only at particular times in history. A suitably broad yet clear definition which points to the general implications of territoriality for humans is what has been missing in previous work on territoriality.

Previous approaches

Most of the considerable literature on territoriality is about animal behavior and does not concern us unless social scientists have borrowed from it in discussing human territoriality.[13] Though not as voluminous as the animal territorial literature, discussions of human territoriality are extremely varied and difficult to summarize. There are as yet no comprehensive reviews and what follows is not an attempt to provide one but rather is a brief illustration of some of the key problems from which many human territorial studies suffer.

Overall, previous analyses of human territoriality have been deficient in three important respects, with particular studies containing one or more of these deficiencies. First, in many cases researchers do not clearly distinguish the term territoriality from the term spatial. For them, simply having events take place in and through space is sufficient for them to have the action fall under the category territorial. Because these studies do not define territoriality as a particular kind of behavior in space, they miss the opportunity of offering a systematic analysis of territoriality. Any insights they present are difficult to attribute to territoriality in particular, and difficult to generalize about.[14] (There are even those which use the term figuratively to refer to 'cognitive' territories.)[15]

Closely related to the first are those studies which actually focus on examples of human territoriality without calling them such. Studies of

zoning, of private property rights in land, of political sovereignty often do not recognize that their subject matter belongs to a territorial class of actions. Hence these studies miss important territorial implications.[16] In the case of the parent controlling his children, it is because we know at least three possible effects of territoriality that we are able to suggest that the parent resorted to territoriality because it made it unnecessary for him to identify, by kind, the things he wished to control. And it is this knowledge of territorial effects that make us expect this very use of territoriality to occur in other quite different contexts. Do not nation states use this effect when they declare sovereignty over everything and anything within their geographic domain? Parents and nation states do not, and probably cannot, list what it is they wish to control, and not listing what it is that is under control allows territoriality to hide what is being controlled. Consider simply the number of times parents hide things from children by not letting them enter places, or that states hide things from foreigners and even citizens by restricting entry to areas or regions within the country. Recognizing that territoriality is a general strategy for establishing access to things and pointing to its generally expected effects can help deepen our understanding of its use in particular cases.

Third are studies which have been conscious of isolating real territorial behavior in humans but which have the drawback of being far too narrow in their meaning. They may have focussed entirely on one social-geographical scale. This is the case in the social-psychological literature portraying territoriality as a form of personal space.[17] Other studies may be too narrow in the territorial effects they stipulate. For example some psychological studies view the use of territoriality by an individual as an expression of specific personality characteristics such as a desire for dominance or security.[18] Linking territoriality to particular needs occurs especially in studies which suppose that humans and animals use territoriality for the same essential biological reasons, i.e., as a means of obtaining food, mates, and controlling population size. Focussing on these narrow effects may make territoriality in humans appear to be something like an instinct rather than a strategy that can be turned on and off.[19] Moreover, these narrow meanings and their emphases on particular scales, purposes, or functions are often embodied in the formal definitions of territoriality. The social psychologist exploring only the personal level and psychological effects of territoriality may define it with this emphasis in mind. For instance, 'self' and 'personality' are part of Altman's definition of territoriality as 'a self/other boundary regulation mechanism that involves personalization of or making of a place or object and communication that it is "owned" by a person or group. Personalization and ownership are designed to regulate social interaction and to help satisfy various social and physical motives.'[20] There occurs the opposite problem of defining territoriality too generally. When it

is intended to mean simply the control of area, we are left without any suggestion about purpose or intent, except that area itself is both an object and an end.[21]

Although these are among the major pitfalls in previous work on territoriality, a few researchers have avoided them, and many of those who have not, have none the less pointed to some of its important aspects. Rather than isolate the positive components piecemeal, they will be noted and incorporated in the work which follows.[22]

Territoriality and geography

Whereas work on territoriality has often been unwittingly about non-territorial spatial behavior, work in geography on spatial behavior has often ignored the territorial. In geography, both natural and human or cultural activities are called 'spatial' to remind everyone that they occur in space and have spatial properties such as locations, shapes, and orientations. Spatial analysis is the branch of geography interested in the interrelationships between activities in the landscape and their spatial properties. In human geography, these include not only the actual locations, extensions, and patterns of things, but how these are described and conceived of in different social and intellectual perspectives. (The identical landscape pattern may be described and evaluated economically, aesthetically, symbolically, and so on.) Geography's concern with multiple uses and conceptions of space, and with the historical geographies of different peoples, presents space as a complex framework in which individuals and groups are situated, through which they interact, and by which they make statements. Yet these interconnections between space and behavior rest on territoriality, the study of which has remained in the background, all but neglected by spatial analysis.[23]

The businesses, farms, and cities studied by geographers are not only places or locations in space with multiple meanings, but also occur and remain in place because there exist numerous social rules and regulations allowing some things to be in certain places and not others. Even the movements of peoples, goods, and ideas require society to set aside roads and the like for transportation and to disallow other activities from taking place on them. Modern city streets are designed for bicycles, cars, trucks, and buses and not for pedestrians. Highways are designed for traffic powered primarily by the internal combustion engine.

For the most part, people and their activities cannot find room in space without forms of control over area – without territoriality. The challenge is to show how and why this is the case. Unfortunately spatial analysts have not systematically explored territoriality to discover if there is a logic to territorial control in the same way as there has been an exploration into the

question of whether there is a logic to non-territorial spatial organization and interaction. Instead, they have focussed on the objects territoriality has helped to form and support and have left territoriality – the geographical bonding agent – in the background.

Spatial analysts understand very well that activities compete for locations. In this respect the focus of their research has been on the process of selecting one site over another and the role played by distance or geographical accessibility in connecting sites. Emphasizing distance has led to a geographical logic based on the metrical properties of space. But spatial analysts have not seriously considered the possibility that geographical logic can be extended by the even more complex logic involved in territorial uses of space.[24] The logic of territorial action is more complex than the logic of distance because territoriality is imbedded in social relations. Territoriality is always socially constructed. It takes an act of will and involves multiple levels of reasons and meanings. And territoriality can have normative implications as well. Setting places aside and enforcing degrees of access means that individuals and groups have removed some activities and people from places and included others. That is, they have established different degrees of access to things.

Territoriality, then, forms the backcloth to human spatial relations and conceptions of space. Territoriality points to the fact that human spatial relationships are not neutral. People do not just interact in space and move through space like billiard balls. Rather, human interaction, movement, and contact are also matters of transmitting energy and information in order to affect, influence, and control the ideas and actions of others and their access to resources. Human spatial relations are the results of influence and power. Territoriality is the primary spatial form power takes.

Territoriality and history

Different societies use different forms of power. They have different geographical organizations and conceptions of space and place. Geographical landscapes and meanings change as societies change. Historical geography is concerned with these interconnections. Historical geography points to the socially historically dependent context of spatial organization and meaning; and territoriality points to the fact that geographical organization and meaning, while depending on many things, also presupposes the maintenance of different degrees of access to people, things, and relationships. Spatial organizations and meanings of space have histories and so too do the territorial uses of space; the three histories are indeed closely interrelated.

The logic of territoriality will show that, as a spatial strategy, it offers several advantages to help affect, influence, and control. These constitute

the domain of reasons for, or consequences of, using territoriality. They explain how and why territoriality is being used and are the basis of its import. Whether or not particular advantages are used in a particular case depends on who is controlling whom and for what purposes. Some advantages can be expected to occur in practically any situation at any time. We found the modern parent employing territoriality in the kitchen because it made it unnecessary for him to explain what it was he did not want his children to handle. We can also imagine the Chippewa parent using territoriality for the same reason.

Not defining what it is that is under one's control is practically a universal advantage of territoriality. We can expect that other very important effects would appear in most types of societies, and still others would appear in only a few. For example, territoriality in the modern world is often an essential means of defining social relationships. As we pointed out, people who reside in a North American city are entitled to the public services of that city. Location within a territory defines membership in a group. This use of territory – to define belonging in a community – occurs to a somewhat lesser degree in pre-modern civilizations, but occurs hardly, if at all, in primitive societies where social relationships are so clearly and so strongly upheld. 'Primitives' may use territoriality to delimit and defend the land they occupy but they rarely use it to define themselves. Other effects of territoriality occur primarily in contemporary society, and still others would take place with equal importance in modern and pre-modern civilizations. As we shall see, the uses of territoriality have been cumulative. Primitive societies found need for a few. Pre-modern civilizations employed these and a few others, and modern society has employed virtually the entire range of possible effects.

We have mentioned a few of the possible territorial effects – the ease by which territoriality can classify, communicate, and enforce control, the ease by which it can define social relationships impersonally and hierarchically. What must be considered now is the range of theoretically possible effects and their interrelationships. These issues are addressed in the theory of territoriality.

2

Theory

We noted that the definition of territoriality contains three interrelated facets. Territoriality must provide a form of classification by area, a form of communication by boundary, and a form of enforcement or control. What will be argued now is that approximately seven other potential effects can be linked to these three facets, and that they, plus the original three, lead to approximately fourteen combinations of characteristics. Note that the precise number is not the critical issue. They can be collapsed into fewer than ten or fourteen. What is critical is that the definition of territoriality be rich enough to delimit the range of potential advantages offered by a territorial strategy and at a level of generality that is precise and useful. Specifying these effects, how they are connected to one another, and the conditions under which they would be employed constitute the theory of territoriality.

The theory will be presented in two parts. First, territoriality is conceptually abstracted from the multiplicity of social-historical contexts. This allows room to describe the internal logic of territoriality: to reveal the range of effects which constitute the domain of reasons for using territorial as opposed to non-territorial strategies and their logical interrelationships. Second, the theory hypothesizes that certain historical contexts will draw upon specific potential effects and, in a very general sense, matches historical contexts with territorial effects.

The theory is both empirical and logical. The first three tendencies are derived from the definition of territoriality. The others, while not entirely derivable from the definition, none the less are logically interconnected and linked to it. Calling the following analysis a theory does not mean that we are taking a mechanistic approach to people and their uses of territory. On the contrary, the theory will present the effects of territory as possibilities which range from the physical to the symbolic: a range spanned by the broad field of spatial analysis. Nor does the word theory mean that accurate predictions about territoriality can be made. Human behavior is far too 'open ended' to

make possible precise social predictions of any consequence. Rather, by theory, is meant that we can disclose a set of propositions which are both empirically and logically interrelated and which can help make sense out of complex actions. In other words, the theory can help us understand and explain, but it is not likely to help us predict precisely what will happen in the future.

The complex structure of the theory may be more easily pictured if we resort to an analogy from physical science. Noting that the theory contains two parts – the range of effects and their uses in historical cases – we can say, at the risk of being branded mechanistic, that the first part is analogous to examining the 'atomic' structure of territoriality: the three facets (classification, communication, and enforcement) are its 'nucleus' and the ten primary and fourteen combinations of effects or tendencies are its 'valences.' These form the potential links that will be drawn upon if and when territoriality is used. The second part is analogous to placing territoriality in a periodic table of types of social-historical organizations and suggesting bondings that can be expected when these contexts use territoriality. Sketching the bonds between historical contexts and territorial effects will be the purpose of the subsequent chapters.

Before turning to the theory itself, a few more words about method and terminology are in order. Territoriality's effects are not simple relationships. Because they pertain to people, not to atoms, they are more appropriately termed potential 'reasons' or 'causes' of, or potential 'consequences' or 'effects' of, territoriality. The appropriateness of one set of names over the other depends on whether an individual (or group) is establishing new territories (in which case the appropriate couplet would be reasons/causes) or are using already existing ones (in which case the appropriate couplet would be consequences/effects). As to whether something is a reason or a cause, or a consequence or an effect, is impossible to know without looking closely at the specific case. And even then there are many who argue that little difference exists between the two. For the sake of simplicity, reasons, causes, consequences, effects, will be used interchangeably to show that these are applicable in any case; and the terms 'potentialities' or 'tendencies' will cover all four options.

Despite this effort at simplification, the theory is still complex and technical. We will need to describe ten *tendencies* and fourteen *combinations* of tendencies for a total of twenty-four effects. This is unavoidable. The theory must be developed as fully as possible early on since the historical chapters are organized around the claims of the theory. Each of the twenty-four effects will be given a common-sense name. In addition, to help distinguish the theory's internal structure, the first ten will each be assigned a number and the fourteen combinations a letter (e.g., the first tendency – classification – will be identified as *1*, and the third combination –

complex hierarchy – will be identified as *c*). The numbers and letters will be used only in this chapter for cross referencing. The remainder of the book will refer to the tendencies and combinations by their names. Omitting the letters and numbers may make it more difficult for the reader to be alerted by the fact that a particular tendency is being addressed. But using only the name of the effect will still allow the reader to identify it as such while making the theoretical structure less obtrusive and distracting to the narrative.

The social construction of territoriality

Conceptually isolating and describing territoriality to some degree apart from particular social contexts may seem analogous to the quest for the meaning of geographic distance in spatial analysis.[1] One critical difference is that territoriality is always socially or humanly constructed in a way that physical distance is not. It can be granted that, in a rudimentary sense, the act of conceiving, describing, and measuring distances is a matter of social construction, and so too are the social forces that place things in certain patterns in space. But territoriality is even more intimately involved with social context. Territoriality does not exist unless there is an attempt by individuals or groups to affect the interactions of others. No such attempt, nor indeed no interaction at all, need exist between two objects in space for there to be a specifiable distance between them.[2] Distances can be compared and measured, but there is little that can be said abstractly about their potentials to affect behavior. Their influence depends on there being actual channels of communication such as roads, railways, and the like, which contain these distances. Indiscriminate substitution of the physical measure of distance for the physically and socially significant channels of communication or interactions runs the risk of treating distance non-relationally.[3]

Unlike distance, territorial relationships are necessarily constituted by social contexts (however general) in which some people or groups are claiming differential access to things and to others. Because of this, more can be said abstractly about the effects of territoriality than can be said about distance, and yet, because territoriality is a product of a social context, whatever is said about it, no matter how abstract, can have normative implications affixed to it and thus can lead back to a social context. It is important to make clear that these normative implications refer to judgments people make about the uses of territoriality. An effect of territoriality may be considered by some as good, or neutral, or bad. Most may agree that using territoriality to prevent children from having access to plates in the kitchen can be an effective and even a benign strategy. Yet to a few it may be deceitful because the parent does not have to disclose to the children which objects they are not allowed to touch. The normative implications people

assign to actions, and in this case territorial actions, are important parts of their effects. A parent may realize territoriality is efficient, but may not use it because he believes it is deceitful. The theory then must have room for the ethical and normative judgments that can be assigned by others to the uses of territoriality. This helps link the theory to society. Yet the theory itself will not present procedures by which one can judge whether an action is, on its own merits, good or bad.

When presenting the tendencies, the social contexts will be pushed far into the background (though specific examples are used to clarify their meanings, they should not be interpreted as specifying the context of the tendency) and the general normative implications will not be addressed until the combinations are discussed. Indeed, some of the combinations differ from one another in the degree to which they draw upon what others may label as benign or malevolent connotations. These normative terms are still intended to be very abstract and general. But by way of an illustration we may consider that a benign context to some may mean that a relationship is non-exploitative. Such a context might be approached at an individual level when a parent uses territoriality to prevent a young child from running into traffic; and at a group level when the workers of a democratically organized and controlled factory elect some of the members to serve for terms as managers. A malevolent territorial relationship, on the other hand, might be thought to occur when differential access through territoriality benefits those exercising territoriality at the expense of those being controlled.[4]

Keeping the descriptions of the tendencies neutral and the normative meanings of the combinations general helps to separate the expression of the theory of territoriality from particular theories of power and society. This allows territoriality an intellectual 'space' of its own and prevents territoriality from becoming the captive of any particular ethical theory or theory of power. The second part of the theory draws upon the capacity of these tendencies to have normative implications and thus to point to particular types of social contexts that may employ them. In this way the theory can be reconnected to specific historical cases and to theories of power.

Theory: part 1

Ten tendencies of territoriality

By definition, territoriality, as an assertion of control, is a conscious act, yet the person(s) exercising territoriality need not be conscious of the ten potentials or tendencies for these effects to exist. These tendencies of territoriality come to the fore, given certain conditions. Moreover, they are not independent of one another. In fact, the first three listed below – classification, communication, and enforcement – can be considered logi-

cally (though not empirically) prior. They are the bases by which the other seven potentialities of territoriality are interrelated, and any or all of the ten can be possible reasons for its use. Even if the first three are not important as reasons in some instances, they must nevertheless still be present because they are part of the definition. In other words, territoriality must provide classification, communication, and enforcement, but it can be 'caused' by one or several or all of the ten. Let us proceed in order from number *1* to number *10* and again be reminded that the terms used to describe them could apply to benign, neutral, or malevolent social contexts. (Each tendency is numbered and the italicized word(s) will serve as the name(s) of the tendency in subsequent chapters.) As the second section will show, tendencies are logically interconnected in numerous ways. The following is more a list of definitions of the tendencies than an illustration of their interrelationships. Yet the order in which they are discussed suggests how some lead to others.

1. Territoriality involves a form of *classification* that is extremely efficient under certain circumstances. Territoriality classifies, at least in part, by area rather than by type. When we say that anything in this area or room is ours, or is off limits to you, we are classifying or assigning things to a category such as 'ours' or 'not yours' according to its location in space. We need not stipulate the kinds of things in place that are ours or not yours. Thus territoriality avoids, to varying degrees, the need for enumeration and classification by kind and may be the only means of asserting control if we cannot enumerate all of the significant factors and relationships to which we have access. This effect is especially useful in the political arena, where a part of the political is its concern with novel conditions and relationships.

2. Territoriality can be easy to *communicate* because it requires only one kind of marker or sign – the boundary. The territorial boundary may be the only symbolic form that combines direction in space and a statement about possession or exclusion. Road signs and other directional signs do not indicate possession. The simplicity of territoriality for communication may be an important reason why it is often used by animals.

3. Territoriality can be the most efficient strategy for *enforcing* control, if the distribution in space and time of the resources or things to be controlled fall well between ubiquity and unpredictability. For instance, models of animal foraging have shown that territoriality is more efficient for animals when food is sufficiently abundant and predictable in space and time whereas non-territorial actions are more suitable for the converse situation. The same has been shown to hold in selected cases of human hunting and gathering societies.[5]

4. Territoriality provides a means of *reifying* power. Power and influence

are not always as tangible as are streams and mountains, roads, and houses. Moreover, power and the like are often potentialities. Territoriality makes potentials explicit and real by making them 'visible.'

5. Territoriality can be used to *displace* attention from the relationship between controller and controlled to the territory, as when we say 'it is the law of the land' or 'you may not do this here.' Legal and conventional assignments of behavior to territories are so complex and yet so important and well understood in the well-socialized individual that one often takes such assignments for granted and thus territory appears as the agent doing the controlling.

6. By classifying at least in part by area rather than by kind or type, territoriality helps make relationships *impersonal*. The modern city, by and large, is an impersonal community. The primary criterion for belonging is domicile within the territory. The prison and work place exhibit this impersonality in the context of a hierarchy. A prison guard is responsible for a block of cells in which there are prisoners; the guard's domain as supervisor is defined territorially. The same is true of the relationship between the foreman and the workers on the assembly line, and so on.

7. The interrelationships among the territorial units and the activities they enclose may be so complicated that it is virtually impossible to uncover all of the reasons for controlling the activities territorially. When this happens territoriality appears as a general, *neutral*, essential means by which a place is made, or a space cleared and maintained, for things to exist. Societies make this *place-clearing function* explicit and permanent in the concept of property rights in land. The many controls over things distributed in space (as the interplay between preventing things without the territory having access to things within and vice versa) become condensed to the view that things need space to exist. In fact, they do need space in the sense that they are located and take up area, but the need is territorial only when there are certain kinds of competition for things (in space). It is not competition for space that occurs but rather a competition for things and relationships in space.[6]

8. Territoriality acts as a *container* or *mold* for the spatial properties of events. The influence and authority of a city, although spreading far and wide, is 'legally' assigned to its political boundaries. The territory becomes the object to which other attributes are assigned, as in the case of the political territory being the unit receiving federal support.

9. When the things to be contained are not present, the territory is conceptually 'empty.' Territoriality in fact helps create the idea of a socially *emptiable place*. Take the parcel of vacant land in the city. It is describable as an empty lot, though it is not physically empty for there may be grass and soil on it. It is emptiable because it is devoid of socially

or economically valuable artifacts or things that were intended to be controlled. In this respect, territoriality conceptually separates place from things and then recombines them as an assignment of things to places and places to things. As we shall see, this tendency can be combined with others to form an extremely important component of modernity – that of emptiable space.

10. Territoriality can help *engender more territoriality* and more relationships to mold. When there are more events than territories or when the events extend over greater areas than do the territories, new territories are generated for these events. Conversely, new events may need to be produced for new and empty territories. Territoriality tends to be space-filling.

These are brief descriptions of the ten consequences that we hypothesize could come from the use of territorial organization and that would be drawn upon to explain the reasons for having territorial, as opposed to non-territorial, activity. Once again, these tendencies are not independent and their precise number and definition is not as critical as the question of whether or not they circumscribe the domain of its potential effects. Not all of them need be used in any particular territorial instance in history, and (as mentioned) their meanings or imports would depend on the specific historical conditions of who controls whom, how, and for what purpose. Some of their interconnections were noted and more will become apparent as we discuss the primary combinations.

Primary combinations

Most of human behavior occurs with hierarchies of territorial organizations: individuals live in cities, which are in states, which are in nations. People work at desks which are in rooms, which are in buildings. Hence everything we said about territories applies, in addition, to hierarchical territorial organizations. For example, having territory used as a mold within a hierarchy of territories, as it is in the context of municipalities, states, and the nation, could mean that a goal, such as 4 percent unemployment, can be assigned precisely for one geographical level, such as the national, rather than for another, such as the state or the municipal. Assigning tasks or responsibilities to different territorial levels may become a general political strategy. Territoriality, as a means of circumscribing knowledge and responsibility, can be used to assign the lowest level and the smallest territory the least knowledge and responsibility and the highest level and largest territory the most.

In this vein, and still without being specific about social contexts, we can proceed to illustrate more of the logical interrelations among the tendencies

Figure 2.1 Internal links among tendencies and combinations

by considering the possible primary combinations and their general import within social hierarchies. We will begin with a list, as we did with the tendencies. This list will address the relationships of tendencies to combinations within hierarchies. The order of the list suggests how some of the combinations lead to others, but the major interconnections among the combinations will be discussed later.

Figure 2.1 is a matrix tracing the connections among the elementary tendencies (*1–10*)) to form the primary combinations (*a* to *n*). The array of combinations in Figure 2.1 is not alphabetical as is the order in the list of combinations. This is because Figure 2.1 groups the combinations discussed in the list by their mixtures of tendencies rather than by the interconnections

among the combinations. (The dynamics among the combinations are illustrated in Figure 2.2.)

Figure 2.1 shows only the important links. A darkened square signifies that a potential is extremely important, and a striped one that it is moderately important. A blank means that the tendency is not important for that particular combination. It does not mean that it has no effect at all. (Note again that whereas (1), (2), and (3) must be attributes of territoriality, they need not be important causes/consequences of territoriality. Their inclusion in the matrix is to indicate when they, as characteristics of territoriality, also become important consequences of territory.) Without linking territoriality to specific social contexts, it is impossible to be more precise about the degree to which each tendency contributes to a combination or whether a darkened area can be called a necessary and/or sufficient condition. It should not be forgotten that some combinations differ only in the connotations and weights placed on their tendencies.

a. Perhaps the most general combination is that all ten tendencies can be important components of complex and rigid *hierarchies*. (1), (2), (3), (6), and (8) are especially important, for they can allow hierarchical circumscription of knowledge and responsibility, impersonal relationships, and strict channels of communications, all of which are essential components of *bureaucracy*. The strength of (8), impersonal relations, affects the degree to which the bureaucracy is modern, according to Weber's criterion.[7]

b. Not only can the scope of *knowledge* be graded according to territorial levels, but so too can the scope of *responsibility* in space and time through enforcing (3) and molding (8) access to information. *Long-term planning* could be made the responsibility of the highest level which would have access to the greatest knowledge and responsibility and *short-term planning* (or no planning at all) would be the responsibility of the lowest territorial level. Moreover, an action could be subdivided into stages: the first having to do with overall initiation of policy and the last having to do with carrying out of the details. The first would pertain to the higher territorial levels, the last to the lower levels.

c. Upper echelons of a hierarchy tend to use territories to define (1), enforce (3) and mold (8) groups, with the result that members may be collected and dealt with impersonally (6). It is this cluster (1, 3, 6, and 8) to which the historical-anthropological literature points when it discusses the *territorial definition of social relationships*.[8] This is a relative concept and its opposite is a *social definition of territory*. The difference between them is a matter of degree. A relatively extreme case of a territorial definition of social relations can be found in our previous comparison of membership in a twentieth-century North American community as compared with membership in the Chippewa community. Yet even in North America both territorial and social definitions can be found in the same place. The requirement for receiving police, legal, and fire protection from an American municipality is that one be located within the geographical bounds of that community. Those who do not even reside there but simply pass through receive these benefits. On the other hand, within the same city, being a visitor in someone's house does not make the visitor a part of the household and does not give the visitor the right to use the household's resources. An actual claim to territoriality may involve elements of both, as when full political citizenship in American municipalities, although granted on the basis of residence, is still given only to U.S. citizens. As we noted in the Chippewa example, primitive societies rely almost entirely on a social definition of territoriality whereas civilizations and especially modern societies do the opposite. Continuous and intense territorial definitions lead, as we shall see, to a conceptually emptiable space (3).

d. A significant yet simple combination is that the hierarchical territorial circumscription (3) of knowledge and responsibility can provide a very efficient means of supervision. For example, constraining the movements of prisoners by placing them in cells makes easier the task of supervising them than if they were allowed to roam freely in the prison. Indeed, even a prison without cells but with an outside wall provides a more effective means of supervision than a non-territorial form of contact such as handcuffing a prisoner to a guard. An important quantitative index of the degree of supervisory efficiency would be the *span of control*, i.e., the number of supervisors per supervisees. This measure is a well-known index of organizational structure and is exhibited by all territorial organizations.[9]

e. The combination of elements constituting a territorial definition of social relationships (1, 3, 6, and 8) in conjunction with a neutral space-clearing device (7), and especially a conceptually empty place (9) point to the possibility, on a practical level, of continually filling, emptying, and rearranging things in a territorial mold for the purpose of efficient functional control. This constant manipulation of things within a territory would lead, on an abstract level, to a conceptual separation and recombination of things and space and thus to a *conceptually emptiable space*. Space – not just place as in (9) – would appear as an efficient functional framework for events. Events and space would seem to be only contingently related. This possibility is especially significant in modern society and characterizes the conception of territory most closely linked with modern modes of thought. Science, technology, and capitalism make practical the idea of repeatedly and efficiently 'filling' and 'emptying' and moving things about within territories of all scales. Planners

expect states to lose or gain population year by year, and federal support to states allows for such changes. On a smaller scale, factory buildings serve as territorial molds or containers to house first one industry, then another, or when no one rents the building, to contain nothing at all. Geographical mobility and territorial power at the political level, and emptying, filling, and arranging at the architectural level, loosen the bonds between events and location and present territory and space as a background for the occurrence of events, a background that can be described abstractly and metrically. Changes in activities are especially prevalent in modern culture. Consumer society makes change essential. Geographically, change and the future are seen as sets of spatial configurations different from those that exist now or that existed in the past. A place that has not changed its appearance has been bypassed by time; it has stood still. Planning for change and thinking of the future means imagining different things in space. It involves imagining the separation and recombination of things in space. Territoriality serves as a device to keep space emptiable and fillable.[10]

f. The combinations of reification (*4*) and displacement (*5*) could lead to a *magical* mystical perspective. Reification through territory is a means of making authority visible. Displacement through territory means having people take the visible territorial manifestations as the sources of power. The first makes the sources of power prominent, whereas the second disguises them. When the two are combined they can lead to a mystical view of place or territory. This often occurs within religious uses of space.

For example, Catholicism reifies when it makes the distinction between the primary sources of power (i.e., faith and the Church invisible) and the physical manifestations of these (i.e., the Church visible). But Catholicism displaces when it has worshippers believe that the physical structures of the Church and its holy places emanate power. The same relationships occur in nationalism. The territory is a physical manifestation of the state's authority, and yet allegiance to territory or homeland makes territory appear as a source of authority.[11]

g. The territorial component in complex organizations can have a momentum of its own, on the one hand increasing the need for hierarchy and bureaucracy and on the other diminishing their effectiveness. This can come about when definition by area (*1*) leads (unintentionally) to the circumscription of the wrong area or the wrong scale and thus to a *mismatch* of territory or a *spillover* of process. The mismatch may become aggravated by using the territory as a mold (*8*). Mismatch and spillover would diminish the organization's effectiveness; but because knowledge and responsibility within the organization are unequally shared, responsibility for rectifying the problem may fall to the existing hierarchy and thus entrench and even increase the role of bureaucracy.

h. Displacement (*5*) and territorial multiplication (*10*) make it easier for the territory to *appear* to be the *end rather than the means* of control. (Appear is emphasized because territoriality, as a strategy, is always a means to an end.) The Catholic Church offers an example of this. By the fifth century A.D., the powers of archbishops were measured in part by the numbers of dioceses and parishes under their control. In order to increase this power, an archbishop would subdivide his see and thereby increase the number of bishops and priests under his supervision.

i. The territorial component can have a *momentum* of its own *to create inequalities*. Its facility in helping to enforce differential access to things (*3*) can become institutionalized in rank, privilege, and class.

j. The same tendencies that contribute to effective organization and bureaucracy, as discussed in (*a*), could change their import by being used as a general means of *dividing and conquering* and making the organization more entrenched and indispensable for the coordination of the parts. In the context of the work place, the ten tendencies can be used to 'deskill' a workforce and create factory discipline.[12]

k. Classification (*1*) and mold (*8*) especially can be used (unintentionally) to *obscure the mismatch* of territory and events by making people believe that the assignment of the particular tasks to the particular territories is indeed appropriate, when in fact the tasks are assigned to the wrong scale. An example of this would be assigning major responsibility for funding pollution abatement to local levels of government when in fact the sources of particular pollutants are not local.

l. Displacement (*5*) and territorial multiplication (*10*) could *direct attention away from causes of social conflict to conflicts among territories* themselves. Examples of this can be seen in the attention given to the urban crises and to the conflicts between the inner city versus the suburbs and the Snowbelt versus the Sunbelt, rather than to social-economic relationships causing the conflicts.

m. Molding (*8*) the geography of actions at various scales, coupled with enforcing long- and short-range planning responsibilities to corresponding levels of the hierarchy (*3*), gives organizations the opportunity to *obscure the geographic impact of an event*. This occurs by correctly specifying the geography at one scale, say the national, and not at the others, or by dividing a decision into parts, so that the initiation of an action (that may be irreversible) is considered in the context of the largest territory and the implementation of the action is left later to the smaller territories.[13] A combination of the two is found in the history of the United States policy regarding nuclear power. It was decided at the national level that a significant fraction of our electricity would be generated by nuclear power. This goal pertained to the nation as a whole and was well under way before the decisions to locate the plants were

made at the local levels and before the decisions to dispose of waste were even contemplated.

n. The same tendencies that could help to make hierarchical organizational control effective (*1, 2, 3, 6,* and *8* or *a* and *j*) could backfire, leading instead to a reduction of control and even to *secession*. Dividing, conquering, de-skilling, and making relationships impersonal may be nullified or offset by the potentials they have of creating disorganization, alienation, and hostility. In many cases the assembly line went too far in circumscribing and de-skilling. Workers have reacted to senseless assignments and to alienation with various degrees of resistance, and industry has recently begun to explore new kinds of organizations aimed at decreasing the territorial circumscription of workers at the lower levels of the hierarchy.[14] Moreover, those who resist circumscription can make use of the existing territories in various ways, as when prisoners literally take possession of cells and cell blocks, or as when political units secede. In cases where the seceding units take a territorial form, we would hypothesize that the reasons for employing territory would come from among the ten tendencies and their combinations.

These potentials, then, are not isolated and independent. The matrix in Figure 2.1, along with the preceding descriptions of the combinations, make it clear that some of the combinations use exactly the same tendencies as do others, but differ in the weights assigned to them and in the emphases placed on their connotations and normative meanings. For example, hierarchy and bureaucracy (*a*) and divide and conquer (*j*), and secession (*n*) all rely heavily on tendencies (*1, 2, 3, 6,* and *8*) but they do so with different imports. Hierarchy and bureaucracy (*a*) can be thought of either as a benevolent or neutral organization using territory. Divide and conquer (*j*) emphasizes the negative aspects of (*1, 2, 3, 6,* and *8*) and describes what might be thought of as a malevolent organization. Secession (*n*) describes the condition wherein an individual or group uses territorial tendencies (*1, 2, 3, 6,* and *8*) to lessen or remove the authority of others. Similarly, obfuscation by assigning the wrong scale territory (*k*) is the malevolent side of mismatch and spillover (*g*). Social conflict obscured by territorial conflicts places a different emphasis on the same tendencies than does territoriality as an end (*h*). Obfuscation by stages (in terms of time and scale) (*m*) is the negative side of long- and short-range planning (*b*); inequalities (*l*) is the negative side of efficient supervision – span of control (*d*).

These fourteen combinations along with the ten primary tendencies are potential reasons/causes, consequences/effects of territoriality that are linked to our definition. The remainer of the book will illustrate that these delimit the domain of potential advantages at a precise and general enough level to be historically significant. Some combinations, such as divide and

conquer, have been associated with territoriality before but most of the tendencies and combinations have not. This is unfortunate because they are necessary components in understanding how even the familiar territorial effects operate. We understand more of territoriality's role in dividing and conquering when we realize that territoriality allows the joint employment of the ten tendencies or that using these ten with slightly different emphases can help organizations become hierarchical and bureaucratic or can help create organization inefficiencies rather than help them to divide and conquer.

Some of the combinations can be collapsed into more general categories, as in joining all combinations that can be *obfuscatory* (*k*, *l*, and *m*) – these indeed form an important component of modernity under capitalism according to Marxist theory, as we shall see, and some can even be further subdivided. Certainly they all can be made narrower as when mismatch by spillover (*g*) is replaced by the narrower economic concept of externality, or divide and conquer (*j*) is replaced by the narrower example of nineteenth-century British colonial policy in Africa. But to do any of this runs the risk of being either too general or too specific. Again, that a definition and its entailments are at a proper level cannot be proven abstractly. We can only illustrate the utility of the theory by exploring case studies of territoriality.

Which potentials are more interrelated and what their interconnections look like constitute the theory's internal dynamics and structure. Figure 2.1 provides some suggestions about more or less likely interconnections: about how some potentialities can reinforce and some negate others. Overall there is the suggestion that territoriality can help increase the efficiency of an organization (whether it be a state, a business, or a church) up to a point, and that it can help shift an organization's goals from benign to malevolent. For instance, defining responsibilities territorially can be efficient, but it can also create inadvertent spillovers and mismatches when the territorial definition becomes a substitute for not knowing what it is that is being controlled. These inefficiencies can lead to the need for more hierarchy and larger territories to coordinate the spillovers and mismatches. But eventually central control will be impaired. This could result in local levels having greater autonomy *de facto* if not *de jure*. Defining responsibility by area can also be used intentionally to obscure or disguise processes, increase the advantages of those in control, and shift the organization from benign to malevolent.

Some of these suggestions are illustrated in Figure 2.2. This diagram begins with the assumption (illustrated by the straight path to 'a') that the original goals of the organization are benign or neutral and that the institution draws from among the tendencies of territoriality to increase its hierarchical control. But some of the internal loops and tipping points suggested above may take hold and make the organization inefficient. This

□ General modern and pre-modern organizational effects

○ Modern organizational effects only

Figure 2.2 Flows, loops, and tipping points

can increase local autonomy and even fragment the organization, or it can push the organization away from neutrality to a malevolent state of dividing and conquering those that it is controlling. The circles point to loops that are especially prevalent in modern society.

These are only a few of the many possibilities arising from the interconnections among the potentials. In order to follow them further, the theory must become more explicit about the types of social context that will be employing particular potentialities of territoriality. Indeed, it must be remembered that social context has never been completely ignored. To a very general degree it is woven into the definition of territoriality itself. We have only pushed it into the background, more so with the tendencies and less so with the combinations. The logic of territoriality can carry the discussion still further, but only by combining it with more and more explicit types of social contexts which can be expected to utilize territoriality. Social context must now come into the foreground in order to fill in more of the internal structure of the theory, just as the periodic table of elements must be available for the atomic structure of an atom to make sense.

Theory: part II

Bondings: history and theory

Social science is acquainted with numerous types and modes of societies. To focus the discussion we will concentrate on social models of Weber and Marx. In addition to being enormously influential, these models have addressed a broad range of social organizations and have a great deal to do with territorial structure. By no means are they the only models to which the theory can be combined.

Weber Two facets especially to Weber's work have a bearing on our discussion. The first considers the internal dynamics of organizations and especially of bureaucracies, and the second addresses the historical–social context in which certain organizations are more or less likely to occur.

Taking the second first, we note that Weber refers to three general or ideal types of organizations: charismatic, traditional, and bureaucratic. The first is not necessarily linked to any period or type of society.[15] Its followers and leaders form a loose organization. There are few if any officers, rules of procedure, and clear hierarchies. But as the group persists, and especially as the question of succession arises, charisma becomes 'routinized.' It gives way to one or the other of two more formal types of organizations: the traditional and the bureaucratic.

As the name implies, traditional organizations are found primarily in premodern societies or civilizations containing social classes and complex divisions of labor. These organizations rely on traditional modes of conduct and problem solving. Often, the leadership is drawn from a specific clan, family, or circle of friends. Justification for authority is based on custom. Hierarchy can be very well developed and complex, but a person's ability and personality may change the power and scope of his appointment. Legitimacy of authority is not drawn from holding an office proper but from being connected to traditional positions of leadership. Traditional organizations occur throughout pre-modern civilizations and they characterize organizations when charisma becomes routinized. Many scholars have called such traditional hierarchies bureaucracies[16] but Weber reserves the term for organizational features found primarily in modern societies which include capitalistic and socialistic economies. We will follow the practice of calling all such organizations bureaucratic, but point to the degree to which they contain modern features such as the ones Weber notes. The routinization of charisma in modern society according to Weber would normally lead to bureaucratic organization. Bureaucracies, in Weber's terms, are characterized by formal lines of communication, clear hierarchy and definitions of authority, and impersonal relations. These make hierarchical organizations modern.

More specifically, Weber argues that:

1) the individual office holders of modern bureaucracies are personally free and subject to authority only with respect to their impersonal official obligations. 2) The bureaucracies themselves are organized in clearly defined hierarchies of offices. 3) Each office has a clearly defined sphere of competence in the legal sense. 4) The office is filled by a free contractual relationship. 5) Candidates are selected on the basis of technical qualifications . . . [often] by examination or diplomas certifying technical training or both. Candidates are appointed, not elected. 6) They are remunerated by fixed salaries in money . . . The salary is primarily graded according to rank in the hierarchy . . . 7) The office is treated as the sole or at least the primary occupation of the incumbent. 8) It constitutes a career. There is a system of 'promotion' according to seniority or to achievement or both. Promotion is dependent on the judgment of superiors. 9) The official works entirely separated from ownership of the means of administration. 10) He is subject to strict and systematic discipline and control in the conduct of the office.[17]

Conversely, hierarchical (bureaucratic) organizations that are not modern tend not to have: a) a clearly defined sphere of competence subject to impersonal rules; b) a rational ordering of relations of superiority and inferiority; c) a regular system of appointments and promotions on the basis of a free contract or technical training; and d) fixed salaries. Note that impersonality is a major undercurrent in the list. The higher the degree of impersonality, the more modern the bureaucracy.

Much recent research on organizational structure has consolidated and extended Weber's components and has contained specific suggestions about their interconnections. The objects of study have for the most part been *twentieth*-century Western industrial organizations but several of the variables and their supposed interconnections can serve as guides to an analysis of pre-modern institutions.

These recent works, as with Weber's, point to the significance of impersonality and impartiality within modern organizational and bureaucratic structures, and also suggest the following as important facets of organizations:

Specialization – which refers to the division of labor;
Standardization – which refers to the extent of procedural regularity in the organization;
Formalization – which refers to the use of documentation for job definition and communication;
Centralization – which refers to the locus of authority in the organization;
Configuration – which refers to the shape of authority and hierarchy and can often be summarized by span of control.

These are of course very general characteristics. More specific meanings differ considerably from study to study. Yet there is consensus that spe-

cialization, standardization, and formalization are strongly interrelated and are connected to the hierarchical structure of organizations and also to technology.[18]

Little modification has been made to the historical facet of Weber's formulation, except that, as we noted, others have used the term bureaucracy more generally to describe the hierarchies in traditional organizations and have found within them some examples of modern bureaucratic facets, such as impersonal relations. Rather, most amendments have been made to the first aspect of Weber's formulation, the description of processes occurring within modern organizations and bureaucracies, and here two avenues of research have a bearing on territoriality.

First, as we have just described, recent work on organizational structures has introduced such facets as standardization, formalization, centralization, and configuration, to consolidate components of Weber's model. Second, research on organizations has explicitly addressed the normative implications of bureaucracy. Weber saw the bureaucratic form as potentially the most rational and efficient. He recognized some of its negative features, such as its tendency to make relationships too uniform and impersonal, which would cause the organization to dissolve or split apart and could create opportunities for charismatic leaders to form new ones. But he was most impressed with bureaucracy's positive potentials of rationality and efficiency. Overall he presented the bureaucracy as an instrument with the potential to do good.

Bureaucracy's negative side was investigated and elaborated more fully by Weber's successors, especially Michels and Merton. Michels examined German socialist organizations and found that, despite their idealistic and egalitarian beginnings, these organizations became increasingly institutionalized, authoritarian, and hierarchically rigid; and the officials became more interested in perpetuating themselves and their offices than in their commitment to the original goals of the organization.[19] This trend he attributed to bureaucracies in general and called it the 'iron law of oligarchy.' Merton disclosed another malevolent side to bureaucracy. An emphasis on strict formal procedures, discipline, and rules, he argued, leaves officials with the view that adherence to formal procedures is an end in itself.[20] This Merton called 'displacement.'

Many other studies of bureaucracy's problems can be cited, and their collective import is that although Weber's characterization was not wrong, there is more to the internal dynamics of bureaucracies which often leads them away from efficiency and benign or neutral effects. Granted, then, that organizations are dynamic, that modern society has complex hierarchical organizations with particular characteristics which Weber calls bureaucratic, and that traditional societies possess traditional though often

complex hierarchies with few modern bureaucratic characteristics, how can this be linked to territoriality?

The union occurs because many of these dynamics are mirrored in the logic of territoriality and because both traditional and modern organizations have employed territoriality as integral parts of their structures. Joining research on modern facets of organization with territoriality can lead to the following expectations. In very general terms, the theory would suggest that in both traditional and modern society territoriality could increase organizational efficiency, centralization, and span of control, but again up to a point. The theory also anticipates, as in Figure 2.2, that tipping points can be reached making it possible for territoriality to weaken an institution. The territorial units can secede or become captured by another organization. The process may be subtle as when territorial units engender bureaucratic inefficiencies and become ends in themselves. If we focus especially on modern facets of bureaucracy, we can expect that in modern society, but also to some degree in pre-modern ones (as will be shown in our discussion of the Catholic Church), territoriality's facility in providing ease of classification, communication, and control could also increase specialization, standardization, and formalization up to a point. The expression 'up to a point' must be emphasized again because the society in which these organizations occur has much to do with the specifics of these relationships and because the critical tipping points in the internal dynamics of the theory can again eventually come to bear to counter some of these effects. These tipping points are the territorial equivalents to bureaucracy's conservative and oligarchical effects.

The theory's internal logic can be refined to yield even more specific relationships when the type of organization using territoriality is more clearly defined. As we shall see in Chapter 6, for modern centralized bureaucratic organizations like the military, the school, and the factory, specifiable quantitative relationships can be expected to hold among degrees of territoriality, span of control, hierarchy, task complexity, and technology.

Whereas many of the relationships between territoriality and complex hierarchical social divisions of labor can be present to varying degrees in practically any organization, we should not lose sight of the fact that some would predominate in modern society. This means that many of territoriality's uses within an organization depend on the society in which the organization occurs. Governments of empires and modern states have territorially subdivided their domains because territoriality can provide these organizations with advantages. But just as there are differences between traditional organizations and modern bureaucracies, so too are there differences in the territorial effects they employ. Comparing the dynamics of these types of organizations with the potential dynamics of

territoriality can help specify the conditions of each. For instance, traditional organizations, unlike modern bureaucracies, would not be expected to emphasize territoriality's effects of creating impersonal relationships and of conceptually emptying space.

Still there are the fascinating and important cases of pre-modern organizations containing some of these modern effects. As we shall see, the Catholic Church is a case in point, but so are the Chinese Mandarin system of selecting officials and the English feudal system of King's Courts. These systems possessed territorial devices to help keep relationships impersonal. One such device was to rotate officials from one territory to another, or at least not to assign an official to his native region.

Marx A second major social theory that could be linked fruitfully with territoriality is Marxism. Marx did not examine the possibility of bureaucratic dynamics as an independent phenomenon. Rather his writings discuss bureaucracy as an institution to be manipulated by class power. This is because Marx taught that the social division of labor, as manifested in ranks, specializations, and roles, is determined by the economic division of labor. The twists and turns of bureaucracy are linked to the development of economic classes and their interrelationships. Once communism removes class conflict, the state, as an agent of oppression, would wither away. Marx did not directly address the question of whether bureaucracy would also wither away along with the state, but in his early critique of Hegel he sees socialism as simplifying the bureaucratization of the state.[21] Recently Marxists have recognized that bureaucratization is a force to be reckoned with in socialist countries, if not in the utopian world of communism. The Soviet bureaucracies have internal dynamics and contradictions of their own. The oligarchical tendencies of government bureaucracy, for instance, can create the equivalent of class structure and interests, and their forms, imports, and dynamics are effected by their social-historical contexts.[22] This literature, then, could add further specifications to the directions and imports of the dynamics within bureaucracy.

More directly to our purposes is that the Marxists' theory of class conflict in capitalism, when applied to territoriality, would single out the *obfuscatory* combinations of territoriality (k, l, and m) as the most important in the later stages of capitalism.[23] The obfuscatory combinations would be expected because of the general tendency of capitalism to disguise class conflict and because of the peculiar position of the state *vis-à-vis* labor and capital which has a particularly important bearing on the theory of the state. On the one hand the state tries to maintain capitalism, and on the other it must contain or reduce class conflict, claiming to be the champion of the people and a vehicle for providing public goods. This dual role means that the sources and forms of power must often be disguised and the obfuscatory tendencies of

territoriality could help do this. Territorial obfuscation need not be applied only at the state or local-state level. It could appear as well in the work place, the school, and in the realms of consumption.

Moreover, Marxist theory, in conjunction with a general analysis of modernity, points to the present and the recent past as the times to expect the most intense and frequent occurrence of *emptiable space* (*e*). This is because capitalism reinforces the view of space as a framework for the location and distribution of events. Capitalism helps turn place into commodities. It helps us see the earth's surface as a spatial framework in which events are contingently and temporally located. Capitalism's need for capital accumulation and growth makes change paramount and, geographically, change means a fluid relationship between things and space. The future is conceived of, and future actions produce, continual alterations of geographical relationships. Territoriality then becomes the mold for both filling space and defining and holding a space empty.

Weberians, as well as Marxists, would point to the fact that pre-modern civilizations may have differed in their uses of territoriality but that the differences in uses among them are in several respects not as great as the differences between their uses and those of modern society. They would also agree that only one other comparable historical watershed has occurred in territorial use, and that took place in the transition between primitive society and civilization. Marx, and Engels especially, characterize the primitive as essentially different from other pre-capitalist modes.[24] To them, the primitive means small-scale egalitarian society with few if any institutions of oppression. The primitive's use of territoriality would be quite different from that found in civilizations, whether pre-capitalist or capitalist. For instance, in primitive society one would not expect to find frequent or intense use of territoriality to form impersonal relations (*6*), to mold (*8*), conceptually to empty place (*9*), or to multiply territories (*10*), and one would not expect to find most of the combinations, especially territorial definition of social relationships (*c*).

There is much more that could be said about the links between the theory of territoriality and Marxist, Weberian, or other theories of power and organization. More specific connections can and will be made later in the book and examined in concrete historical cases. In discussing modernity in subsequent chapters we will be considering the interpretations of territoriality by neo-Smithians and neo-Keynesians as well as by Weberians and Marxians. But this sketch is sufficient to point to the possible areas upon which a history of territoriality should concentrate.

Figure 2.3 summarizes the principal relationships we mentioned between uses of territoriality and their association with those social-historical contexts suggested especially by Marx, Weber, and a general understanding of history. It emphasizes the broad connection between territoriality and


Figure 2.3 Historical links

change in political economy. It thus considers an economic division of labor to be a primary factor in determining who controls whom and for what purposes. This does not mean of course that territoriality is unaffected by other economic as well as non-economic factors – indeed Figure 2.2 suggests how hierarchical organization is one such influence on territoriality. Rather it proposes that the most general territorial changes can be associated with changes in political economy. The two critical historical periods indicated in Figure 2.3 are the rise of civilizations and the rise of capitalism and modernity. (Although capitalism and modernity are not synonymous – the latter includes cultural and ideological components that are not reducible to economic terms – capitalism is an historically crucial element of modernism and for the sake of brevity the two terms will sometimes be used interchangeably. So called 'socialist' countries such as the Soviet Union are also modern, but as there is little consensus about their political economic form, their use of territoriality will not be discussed separately.)

In the rise of civilizations, the most important novel effects of territoriality are its uses in governing others, in defining social relationships, in dividing, subduing, and organizing populations. The most important novel territorial effects accompanying the rise of capitalism are its uses in conceptually emptying space, in creating modern bureaucracies, and in obscuring sources of power. These are sketches of the overriding connections between historical organization and territorial functions, and, along with Figure 2.2 and the general suggestions contained in Figure 1.2, will serve as the organizing models for the rest of the book.

Figure 2.3 summarizes ideas about the past, but so too does all written history, as opposed perhaps to what actually happened in the past. The succeeding chapters will attempt to show that the historical record (including what others than Marx and Weber have said about the past) tends to bear out these hypothesized associations. I use the words 'tends to' for several reasons. The span of time and space to be covered is vast. Only the highlights can be sketched which means judiciously selecting cases and sampling the vast quantity of secondary sources. Historical interpretation is in continuous flux; alternative views abound for practically any period as do debates about the period's importance and duration. What capitalism is and when it became important is scarcely resolved. The same is true for other periods and social organizations. Although what Marx and Weber offer are general models (and models, especially social ones, are only partial and approximate representations of reality), large numbers of more detailed historical studies can be found which tend to accept their general social typologies. Evidence from these detailed works will be used in the next chapter to flesh out the relationships suggested in Figure 2.3; and especially to highlight the two overall transitions – from primitive to civilized, and from pre-capitalist to capitalist. These changes will also be described in conjunction with

changes in the conceptions and uses of space and time. Chapter 3, then, is an overview of the history of 'Territoriality, space, and time.'

Figure 2.3 emphasizes the economic forces behind social-territorial relationships. But it also suggests that several territorial effects, such as defining things by area, and enforcing access, can occur in any society, whereas others, such as the use of territoriality to make relationships impersonal and to increase span of control, can be found in all civilizations, but more so in modern than in pre-modern ones. In other words, institutions with modern characteristics can exist within pre-modern societies and vice versa. Moreover, what is not described in Figure 2.3, but is implied in the general matrix of Figure 2.1 and is illustrated in Figure 2.2, is that the relationships among people and territory can undergo important changes while the society in which they occur does not. Even though the political economy of a society (at least at the level of generalization described in Figure 2.3) may remain the same, the territorial effects between people and within an organization, as illustrated by Figure 2.2, may have a dynamic of their own. Chapter 4, on the Church, will explore these possibilities by examining the internal territorial dynamics of Church organization and its relationship to political economic change.

The Church is one of the most enduring and best-documented examples of an institution using territoriality as an integral part of its organization. The parish, the diocese, the archdiocese, and also the architectural partitioning of church buildings, clearly reveal the Church's reliance on territoriality. These aspects of Church organization were developed differently during three major historical periods, the Classical, the Feudal, and the Modern. Yet during the last period, the Church's internal dynamics seem to have resisted many of the external political-economic changes accompanying modernization. In the Roman and Feudal periods, the territorial effects of the Church were far more modern than was the case with other institutions of the time, but by the end of the Middle Ages the same effects served to separate the Church from society and insulate it from social change, so that since the Reformation the Church stands more as an example of an archaic than a modern organization. This mixture of change and persistence, of internal dynamics and resistance to change, makes the Church an important case study of the interconnections among hierarchy, bureaucracy, and territoriality, from pre-modern times to the present.

Chapter 5, 'The American territorial system,' will use the political formation of North America, from the sixteenth century to the present, to concentrate again on the themes of modern territoriality use, especially their role in creating a concept of emptiable space, in facilitating bureaucracy, and in obscuring sources of power. Chapter 6, 'The work place,' will concentrate on how these same modern uses of territoriality have developed in the last 300 years at the local and architectural levels.

7

Conclusion: society, territory, and space

Space and time are fundamental components of human experience. They are not merely naively given facets of geographic reality, but are transformed by, and affect, people and their relationships to one another. Territoriality, as the basic geographic expression of influence and power, provides an essential link between society, space, and time. Territoriality is the backcloth of geographical context – it is the device through which people construct and maintain spatial organizations. For humans, territoriality is not an instinct or drive, but rather a complex strategy to affect, influence, and control access to people, things, and relationships. Its geographical alternative is non-territorial spatial behavior. Focussing on the latter has led geography and social science to emphasize the effects on human behavior of such metrical properties of space as distance. Unfortunately, this focus has been too constraining to permit development of a complex spatial logic. Adding a territorial component with a non-metrical emphasis to geographical analysis can help expand the logic of space, making it more flexible and realistic by imbedding it in social relations.

Territories are socially constructed forms of spatial relations and their effects depend on who is controlling whom and for what purposes. The task of the theory of territoriality is to disclose the possible effects of territoriality at levels that are both general enough to encompass its many forms, and yet specific enough to shed light on its particular instances. The multiple and complex interrelationships among the tendencies and combinations constitute the theory's internal dynamics. Some of these, like divide and conquer, are familiar. Most are not. Even the familiar ones are made clearer when their logical connections to other territorial effects are specified. We understand more of territoriality's role in dividing and conquering when we realize that territoriality can result in the joint employment of a specific group of tendencies, and that using these with slightly different emphases can help organizations become hierarchical and bureaucratic or can lead them to inefficiencies rather than help them to divide and conquer.

The theory's complex internal structure – its loops and tipping points – reveal territoriality's own internal dynamics. Which of the effects and interrelationships will actually be used, and what their import would be, depends on the social contexts of who is actually using territoriality and for what purposes. Specifying the context is not simply a matter of disclosing facts, for the evidence we marshal and the interpretations we give them depend on our ideas or models of who is in charge, from the personal level through to the societal. This book has explored only a few of the many possible connections among territoriality, theory, and context. Re-examining territoriality's link to these, as well as exploring its connections to others, offers a broad avenue for future research.

Conjoining territoriality as we did to a few broad models of social relations reveals that some of territoriality's effects can occur in practically any society. Others, though, are most often associated with particular political economic organizations. The rise of civilizations, and the rise of capitalism and modernity, are the two historical transitions which have seen the greatest changes in territoriality. In the first, the most important change was the use of territoriality to define and control people within a society as well as between societies; and in the second, was the use of territoriality to effect a sense of emptiable space, of impersonal relations, and of obscuring sources of power. Whereas territoriality underwent two major historical changes, social space and time appear to have undergone only one change in meaning of comparable proportions, and this occurred with the rise of capitalism and modernity. Territoriality, and the changing meaning of space and time, did not themselves occasion these political economic changes, but they did play fundamental roles in specifying the function and meanings of change.

The historical and global relationships among territory, space, time, and society are far too important and complex for us to have done more in a single volume than sketch their highlights. Even the focus on the role of territoriality in modern times was examined within only one cultural context. Doubtless, the three modern territorial facets – although critical to modernity everywhere – appear with different emphases in parts of the world other than the United States. In Europe, for instance, the development of an abstract sense of space did not occur as soon at the political territorial level as it did in the United States. And in Third World countries it still has not penetrated to as many levels as in North America. Indeed, the African continent, which, like the North American, was carved up abstractly and geometrically by colonial powers, retains, at the local level, much more of a sense of a social definition of territory, even though many of these tribal territorial areas were originally colonial demarcations that have since become instilled with social meanings. Similarly in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World, land holdings, whether personal or social, are

not as unencumbered with historical and cultural meanings as they are in North America that they can appear as emptiable and fillable parcels. Although in these societies modern Western uses of territory have become more important, they are still deeply intermixed with complex patterns of pre-existing meanings and uses, and form different mixtures and intensities of old and new than are found in the North American example. Even Japan, a modern industrial society by any standard, uses these modern potentialities of territoriality with different intensities than does the United States. Comparing these mixtures is another reason to caution against associating territorial changes entirely with political economic ones. Just as culture, tradition, and history mediate economic change, they also mediate the way people and place are linked, the way people use territoriality, and the way they evaluate land.

Even in the North American context we can point to the persistence of pre-modern forms as well as to strategies about space and time that have been adopted to counter the prevailing experiences of modernity. And here too these attempts are stamped by culture. Americans have attempted to anchor themselves in space by creating historical landscapes in the forms of historical parks, national monuments, outdoor museums, historical preservation areas, and even pre-historical landscapes in wilderness areas. Americans have encouraged a love and allegiance to place in nationalism and patriotism, and they have sought for roots in neighborhood and small town America. Another antidote to viewing space as cold and abstract is the effort by geographers to introduce humanistic components to geographical analyses: to remind us that space is not experienced in everyday affairs only as an abstract emptiable framework on which events are contingently related. Rather space and place are filled with content and meaning. But modern, and especially American, society uses other and perhaps more pervasive means to place personal content in a space that is cold and abstract. Ironically these means are themselves part of the same processes that have helped impart these cold and impersonal qualities to geographical context.

We have seen that the development of an abstract metrical space went hand in hand with capitalism's need to increase production and consumption. An abstract space and time provide the economy with a powerful, practical, and easily manipulated framework to organize people and resources for a mass society. Also we have seen that this same spatial system makes it difficult to feel at home, to be rooted to place. At the same time that we decry the loss of personal ties and attempt to re-establish roots, the economic system, with its emphasis on consumption, holds out the promise of a solution to these paradoxes. It is through consuming products, we are told, especially by advertising, that we can once again be in the center of the world; that we can establish control over our own destinies. The act of

consuming is supposed to create warm and meaningful contexts – both small and large, both ephemeral and substantial – and thereby it claims to address many of the problems consumption itself creates. Yet in fact consumption further exacerbates the problem because it is through consumption that the geographical and historical contexts are further fragmented, abstracted, and juxtaposed.

The economic order once again is undeniably of major importance. But its forms and effects depend on contexts. The theory of territoriality recognizes that differences exist in the degree to which modernity is manifested in different societies and that these differences may be due not only to cultural contexts but also to organizational dynamics. Organizational structures, like bureaucracies, may be relatively immune from all but major changes within political-economic systems, and some organizations may change far more than do their broader social contexts. There is, in other words, a dynamic to organizations which territoriality shares. This dynamic is seen within the Catholic Church; it can be seen within the bureaucracies of capitalist and socialist countries. In terms of social theory this means that in addition to the economic division of labor there exist broad social divisions having significant effects on who is controlling whom and for what purposes. And the theory of territoriality helps to specify the more likely effects that can occur within complex social organizations. Whatever the goals of a society may be – whether they are capitalistic, socialistic, or communistic – and whatever the geographical scale – whether local, national, or global – a society, simply as a complex organization, will need territoriality to coordinate efforts, specify responsibilities, and prevent people from getting in each other's way. And since territoriality of one sort or another will likely be employed, we must be aware that it possesses its own potentialities to affect and control, and that some of these may be contrary to the goals of the society. To plan without these considerations in mind would be to neglect significant determinants of social relations. Territoriality, as a component of power, is not only a means of creating and maintaining order, but is a device to create and maintain much of the geographic context through which we experience the world and give it meaning.

Notes

1. The meaning of territoriality

1 For Chippewa history see Edmund Danziger Jr, *The Chippewas of Lake Superior* (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1978); David Horr (ed.), *American Indian Ethnohistory: North Central and Northeastern Indians*, vols. 1–6 (New York: Garland Press, 1974); Harold Hickerson, *The Chippewa and Their Neighbors: A Study in Ethnohistory* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970); and Edwin Higgins in collaboration with the Whitefish Lake Indian Reservation, no. 6, *Whitefish Lake Ojibway Memories* (Cobolt, Ontario: Highway Book Shop, 1982).

2 Harold Hickerson, *op. cit.*, n. 1, p. 9.

3 The North American aboriginal Indians made maps, often portraying vast areas. These maps contained physical features and the locations of Indian groups but did not indicate land holdings or territorial boundaries. Nor did the maps use a consistent scale or perspective. In many cases these Indian drawings provided Europeans with their only information about the New World and were therefore used as the basis of many European maps of the area.

4 Eleanor Leacock, 'Introduction,' in Frederick Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (New York: International Publishers, 1972), pp. 19–20. See also Diamond Jenness, 'The Ojibwa Indians of Parry Island, Their Social and Religious Life,' *National Museum of Canada Bulletin*, 78 (1954) (Anthropological Series no. 17).

5 Max Farrand, *The Legislations of Congress for the Government of the Organized Territories of the United States: 1798–1895* (Newark, N.J.: Wm A. Baker, Printer, 1896).

6 For a discussion of these two aspects of concepts in philosophy of science see May Brodbeck, 'Meaning and Action,' in May Brodbeck (ed.), *Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 58–78; and for their applications in geography see Robert Sack, 'A Concept of Physical Space in Geography,' *Geographical Analysis*, 5 (1973), pp. 16–34.

7 As is shown in the remainder of this chapter, definitions of territoriality are important. There are no other definitions exactly like this one. Most state simply that territory is the defense of area. There are one or two that seem close in intention to ours. See for example Ryda Dyson-Hudson and E. Alden Smith, 'Human Territoriality: An Ecological Reassessment,' *American Anthropologist*, 80 (1975), pp. 21–41; and Edward Soja, *The Political Organization of Space* (Washington, D.C.: Association of American Geographers, Commission on College Geography, 1971). For a review of some of the many meanings of human territoriality see Torsten Malmberg, *Human Territoriality: Survey of Behavioral Territories in Man with Preliminary Analysis and Discussion of Meaning* (The Hague: Mouton, 1980); and Mark Wiljanen, 'A Critical Examination of a Concept of Human Territoriality with a Case Study in the History of American School Design' (Madison: University of Wisconsin, Department of Geography, Masters thesis, 1983).

8 'Ordinary places' glosses over many special geographical meanings of place, region, or area. The classic study on the geographical meanings of place and region is Richard Hartshorne, *The Nature of Geography: A Critical Survey of Current Thought in the Light of the Past* (Lancaster: Association of American Geographers, 1939, and reprinted with corrections, 1961). Ron Johnston (ed.), *The Dictionary of Human Geography* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981) has more recent definitions.

9 Note that Von Thunen's zones and central place hinterlands are not territories, except for Christaller's administrative areas. See Walter Christaller, *Central Places in Southern Germany*, trans. by Carlisle Baskin (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966); and Brian Berry, *Geography of Market Centers and Retail Distribution* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967).

10 For a debate on the subject see Robert Ardrey, *The Territorial Imperative* (New York: Atheneum, 1966); M. F. Montagu (ed.), *Man and Aggression* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968); Torsten Malmberg, *op. cit.*, n. 7; J. Edney, 'Human Territoriality,' *Psychological Bulletin*, no. 81 (1974), pp. 959–75; and C. Fischer, 'The Myth of "Territoriality" in van den Berge's "Bringing the Beasts Back In",' *American Sociological Review*, 40 (1975), pp. 674–6. Our analysis will demonstrate that many of the effects and advantages of territoriality are applicable only to humans.

11 According to R. Taylor, 'Human Territoriality: A Review and a Model for Future Research,' *Cornell Journal of Social Relations*, 13, no. 2 (1978), pp. 125–51, territoriality is not meaningful as an autonomous concrete object, but rather must be understood in terms of its functions which vary across levels and forms of social organizations.

12 Jean Piaget and Barbel Inhelder, *The Child's Conception of Space*, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956).

13 For a review of the literature on animal territoriality see C. Carpenter, 'Territoriality: A Review of Concepts and Problems,' in Anne Roe and George Simpson (eds.), *Behavior and Evolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), pp. 224–50; and John Calhoun, 'The Role of Space in Animal Sociology,' *Journal of Social Issues*, 22, no. 4 (1966), pp. 46–58.

14 Consider the numerous ethnographic studies which describe behavior in space as territorial. For instance see E. Speck, *Family Hunting Territories and Social Life of Various Algonkian Bands of the Ottawa Valley* (Ottawa: *Geological Survey Memoir 70*, Anthropological Series no. 8, 1915); A. Carr-Saunders, *The Popula-*

tion Problem: A Study in Human Evolution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1922); Robert Lowie, *The Origins of the State* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1962); and A. Radcliffe-Brown, 'Preface,' in M. Fortes and E. Pritchard (eds.), *African Political Systems* (London: Oxford University Press, 1941). The lack of differentiation in the last two especially have led to mistaken interpretations of Morgan's thesis of a shift from a social to a territorial definition of social relations with the rise of civilizations. A book using territoriality in the title but which does not distinguish between territorial and non-territorial behavior in space is E. Gordon Erickson, *The Territorial Experience* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981).

15 See Cornelius B. Bakker and Marianne K. Bakker-Rabdue, *No Trespassing: Explorations in Human Territoriality* (San Francisco: Chandler and Sharp, 1973).

16 Examples are the concepts of externalities and spillovers in economics and public policy (Robert Bennett, *The Geography of Public Finance* (London: Methuen, 1980)). Political geography has been in the position of studying territories such as nation states, but it has not emphasized the logic of territoriality. Rather it has tended to reduce the territorial to the study of non-territorial spatial relations as when political geographers study the shapes of states, their relative locations, the locations of their capitals, and the distributions of resources within their boundaries. Recently some interest by political geographers in territoriality has surfaced, but it has not yet led to a systematic analysis of its role in power. See Stanley Brunn, *Geography and Politics in America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1974); and J. Gold, 'Territory and Human Spatial Behavior,' *Progress in Human Geography*, 6 (1982), pp. 44–67. Some useful suggestions are found in Kevin Cox, *Conflict, Power and Politics in the City: A Geographic View* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973), chapter 2.

17 Examples are found in Erving Goffman, *Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1961); Robert Sommer, *Personal Space* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969); H. Prochansky, W. Ittleson, and L. Rivlin (eds.), 'Freedom of Choice and Behavior in a Psychological Setting,' in *Environmental Psychology: Man and His Physical Setting* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), pp. 173–83.

18 See Irwin Altman and William Haythorn, 'The Ecology of Isolated Groups,' *Behavioral Science*, 12 (1967), pp. 169–82; and Eric Sundstrom and Irwin Altman, 'Field Study of Territorial Behavior and Dominance,' *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 30 (1974), pp. 115–24.

19 The most notorious example is Robert Ardrey, *op. cit.*, n. 10. Even Torsten Malmberg, *op. cit.*, n. 7, uses instinct in his definition. 'Human behavioral territoriality is primarily a phenomenon of ethological ecology with an instinctive nucleus, manifested as more or less exclusive space, to which individuals or groups of human beings are bound emotionally and which, for the possible avoidance of others, are distinguished by means of limits, marks or other kinds of structurings with . . . display, movement or aggressiveness . . .' (pp. 10–11).

20 Irwin Altman, *The Environment and Social Behavior: Privacy, Personal Space, Territory and Crowding* (Monterey, California: Brooks/Cole Publishing Co., 1975), p. 107.

21 Territory is, according to A. Parr, in 'Environmental Design and Psychology,' *Landscape*, 14, no. 2 (1964), pp. 15–18, 'The space which a person . . . claims as

his or their own, and will defend'; according to J. Gold, *op. cit.*, n. 16, p. 49, it is 'any form of behavior displayed by individuals and groups seeking to establish, maintain, or defend specific bounded portions of space.' These particular references were brought to my attention by Julie Fisher.

22 I am referring here especially to Edward Soja, *op. cit.*, n. 7, and Ryda Dyson-Hudson and E. Alden Smith, *op. cit.*, n. 7.

23 Reviews of these theories of spatial analysis and approaches are found in Douglas Amedeo and Reginald Golledge, *An Introduction to Scientific Reasoning in Geography* (New York: John Wiley, 1975), especially chapters 7 and 8; Peter Haggett, Andrew Cliff, and Allen Frey, *Locational Analysis in Human Geography*, 2nd edn (London: Edward Arnold, 1977); and Richard Morrill, *The Spatial Organization of Society* (North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1974).

24 The spatial logic associated with distance has been called the 'distance decay assumption.' It is most extravagantly presented in William Bunge, *Theoretical Geography* (Studies in Geography, Series C, General and Mathematical Geography, No. 1, Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1966). Among the many discussions of the difficulties with the use of distance as a variable in the analysis of human behavior are Gunnar Olsson, *Birds in Egg* (Ann Arbor: Department of Geography, University of Michigan, 1975), especially his analysis of the geographical inference problem, p. 465; and Robert Sack, *op. cit*, n. 6.

2. Theory

1 The attempts to isolate the effects of distance are part of the more general efforts to isolate the effects of spatial relations. The difficulty has been that space and its properties are part of all phenomena and yet are measurable independently of phenomena. A distance between two events can be measured precisely regardless of what these two events are and what stands between them. But the effect which that distance may have on the interconnections between these two events (excluding gravitational interactions) will be modified by the types of things that stand between, or more precisely by the media through which the interactions are to take place. If the phenomena refer to two people who want to have a normal conversation and are standing three feet apart, the medium will usually be the air between them that will carry the sound. If the air is not still, the distance will have to be shorter than three feet. In other words the effects of distance cannot be generalized independently of the specific medium even though we can measure distances independently of the medium. To attribute a significance to distance or to other spatial properties without regard to the substances or medium to which they refer is to over-generalize about the significance of space. This over-generalization has been called a non-relational concept of space: Robert Sack, *Conceptions of Space in Social Thought: A Geographic Perspective* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980), pp. 80–1.

2 The medium affects the role of distance in physical processes with one major exception: the Newtonian equations for gravity. According to Newton, the gravitational force between two masses is directly proportional to their sizes and inversely proportional to the square of their distances. This inverse effect of distance is not modified by the presence or absence of intervening material.

Distance itself, absolutely and independently of matter, affects gravitational attraction. But this is the only example even in Newtonian physics in which distance has such an effect. And this system has since been reformulated by Relativity Theory to the effect that distance is a field of force and is not empty space. Some influential geographers and sociologists interested in spatial analysis unfortunately focussed on this one example to the exclusion of the more applicable cases and used it as a model for the effect of distance on human interactions. Their formulations were called the 'laws of social physics' in which the Newtonian equation of gravitational attraction formed the primary model. The basic model they presented is the distance interaction equation which states that the interaction between two population centers is directly related to their population sizes and inversely related to the distance between them. These and related attempts to isolate distance's effects without regard to the intervening substances treat space non-relationally. For examples of such attempts see William Bunge, *Theoretical Geography* (Studies in Geography, Series C, General and Mathematical Geography, No. 1, Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1966); William Warntz, 'Geography of Prices and Spatial Interaction,' *Papers and Proceedings, Regional Science Association*, 3 (1957), pp. 118–29. Warntz states: 'space and time are to be recognized not just as cost-incurring external frictions, but rather as dimensions of the economic system and hence to be treated isomorphically in the rigid pattern of mathematical physics' (p. 128).

3 Robert Sack, 'A Concept of Physical Space in Geography,' *Geographical Analysis*, 5 (1973), pp. 16–34.

4 There are many discussions of possible definitions of what is benign and malevolent and how these definitions themselves have normative implications. For a review of the geographical literature see Anne Buttimer, *Values in Geography* (Washington, D.C.: Association of American Geographers, Commission on College Geography Resource Paper 24, 1974); and Bruce Mitchell and Dianne Draper, *Relevance and Ethics in Geography* (London: Longman, 1982).

5 This point has been made by Ryda Dyson-Hudson and E. Alden Smith, 'Human Territoriality: An Ecological Reassessment,' *American Anthropologist*, 80 (1975), pp. 21–41; and perhaps first by Marshall Sahlins, 'The Social Life of Monkeys, Apes and Primitive Man,' in J. N. Spuhler (ed.), *The Evolution of Man's Capacity for Culture* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1959), p. 58. For a recent discussion of spatial strategies in hunting-gathering societies see, B. Winterhalder and E. Smith (eds.), *Hunter-Gatherer Foraging Strategies: Ethnographic and Archeological Analyses* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).

6 This neutrality of territoriality has been identified by J. Edney as one of its most important effects. He states: 'the prime function of territoriality is precisely the thing that makes its true and most useful nature so elusive: to provide sufficient organization, structure, and predictability to be allowed to fade into a reliable background which the occupant does not have to concern himself with, but which is crucial for the subsequent development of more advanced behaviors and . . . efforts. The functions and benefits of territory would be drastically reduced if it

could not be taken for granted.' In 'Human Territories: Comment on Functional Properties,' *Environment and Behavior*, 8 (1976), p. 43.

7 W. Scott, *Rational, Natural and Open Systems* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1981), p. 68.

8 Edward Soja, *The Political Organization of Space* (Washington, D.C.: Association of American Geographers, Commission on College Geography, 1971) reviews these and other anthropological perspectives.

9 James D. March (ed.), *Handbook of Organizations* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1965), *passim*.

10 A discussion of the modern facets involved in thinking of space as conceptually empty, and yet being able to describe it geometrically, is found in Robert Sack, *op. cit.*, n. 1.

11 Reification and displacement produce an effect similar to the one described as conflation of symbol and referent. See Robert Sack, *op. cit.*, n. 1, especially Chapter 6; and M. Mauss, *A General Theory of Magic* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), especially chapter 3.

12 See Chapter 6 in this book, and R. Edwards, *Contested Terrain* (New York: Basic Books, 1979); M. Katz, 'Our Origins of the Institutional State,' *Marxist Perspectives*, 4 (1978), pp. 6–22; and S. Marglin, 'What Do Bosses Do? The Origin and Functions of Hierarchy in Capitalist Production,' *Review of Radical Political Economics*, 6 (1974–5), pp. 36–60.

13 J. Pressman and D. Wildavsky, *Implementations: How Great Expectations in Washington are Dashed in Oakland* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); G. Vernex, 'Overview of the Spatial Dimensions of the Federal Budget,' in N. Gluckman (ed.), *The Urban Impact of Federal Policies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), pp. 67–102.

14 S. Aguren, 'The Volvo Kalmar Plant' (Stockholm: The Rationalization Council, Swedish Information Services, 1976); and F. Emery and E. Thorsrud, *Form and Content in Industrial Democracy* (London: Tavistock, 1969).

15 Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, trans. by A. Hanerson and T. Parsons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947).

16 K. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957).

17 Weber, *op. cit.*, n. 15, pp. 333–4.

18 D. Pugh and R. Payne, *Organizational Behavior in its Context: The Aston Programme III* (Westmead: Saxon House, 1977); and Joan Woodward (ed.), *Industrial Organization: Behaviour and Control* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970).

19 Robert Michels, *Political Parties* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1949).

20 Robert Merton, *Social Thought and Social Structure* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1957).

21 See Karl Marx's writings on Hegel, and A. Giddens, *Capitalism and Modern Social Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), pp. 237–8, for a discussion of Marx and bureaucracy.

22 G. Konrad and I. Szelenyi, *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*, trans. by A. Arate and R. Allen (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979); Andras

Hegedus, *Socialism and Bureaucracy* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1976), especially chapter 1; Serge Mallet, *Bureaucracy and Technology in the Socialist Countries* (Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 1974); and Ernest Mandel, *On Bureaucracy: A Marxist Analysis* (London: I.M.G. Publications, 1973).

23 M. Dear, 'Theory of the Local State,' in A. Burnett and P. Taylor (eds.), *Political Studies From Spatial Perspectives* (New York: John Wiley, 1981, pp. 183–200; K. Newton, 'Conflict Avoidance and Conflict Suppression: The Case of Urban Politics in the United States,' in K. Cox (ed.), *Urbanization and Conflict in Market Societies* (Chicago: Maaroufa Press, 1978), pp. 76–93; and R. Walker and M. Heiman, 'The Quiet Revolution for Whom?', *Annals, Association of American Geographers*, 71 (1981), pp. 67–83.

24 Frederick Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (New York: International Publishers, 1972). As we will state in Chapter 3 more fully, the term primitive is not meant here as a pejorative but rather as a term referring to a form of social organization that existed before the rise of civilization and which persisted in some groups until the recent past. For the ideological component of the term primitive see Stanley Diamond, *In Search of the Primitive* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1974).

3. Historical models: territoriality, space, and time

 1 There are no book length works devoted to the history of the relationships between political economy and geographical conceptions of space, though several works discuss key periods and issues. See for example, Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, 3 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), *passim*; Anthony Giddens, *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981); George Gurvitch, *The Social Frameworks of Knowledge* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971); Stephen Kern, *The Culture of Time and Space 1880–1918* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983); Donald Lowe, *The History of Bourgeois Perception* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Lewis Mumford, *Technics and Civilization* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1934), especially pp. 9–28; Robert Sack, *Conceptions of Space in Social Thought: A Geographic Perspective* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980); Pitirim Sorokin, *Socio-Cultural Causality, Space, Time* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1984); Yi-Fu Tuan, *Space and Place, The Perspective of Experience* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977), and *Segmented Worlds and Self* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982). For the most thorough Marxist interpretations of the uses of space by capitalism, see David Harvey, *The Limits to Capital* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), and Neil Smith, *Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and the Production of Space* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984).

 2 See E. S. Deevey Jr, 'The Human Population,' *Scientific American*, 203 (1960), pp. 195–204, for population estimates.

 3 For a discussion of the meaning of the term primitive see Stanley Diamond, *In Search of the Primitive* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1974).

 4 As we noted in Chapter 2, the principal historical divisions upon which we will

concentrate are the primitive, pre-modern/pre-capitalist, and modern/capitalist. There are many other historical divisions and types of economies, as are there models of how they worked. The historical divisions in this book, as well as the models of their political economies, are ones that accommodate an emphasis on space, time, and territoriality. Needless to say they are sketches and draw from more general historical models. For the background to these divisions and modes see discussions of modes of production in Anthony Giddens, *op. cit.*, n. 1; Eric Hobsbawm (ed.), *Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations* (New York: International Books, 1975); Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944); and Eric Wolf, *Europe and the People Without History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).

 5 What is being described here as a band is an abstraction containing a variety of types. For a discussion of patrilocal bands see A. Radcliffe-Brown, 'Preface,' in M. Fortes and E. Evans-Pritchard (eds.), *African Political Systems* (London: Oxford University Press, 1941); H. J. Heinz, 'Territoriality Among the Bushmen in General and the !Ko in Particular,' *Anthropos*, 67 (1972), pp. 405–16; and N. Peterson, 'Hunter-Gatherer Territoriality: The Perspective from Australia,' *American Anthropologist*, 77 (1975), pp. 53–68. For bilateral, fluid membership models see R. B. Lee and I. DeVore (eds.), *Man the Hunter* (Chicago: Aldine, 1968); and for an overall review see Elman Service, *Primitive Social Organization: An Evolutionary Perspective* (New York: Random House, 1962).

 6 See Morton Fried, *The Evolution of Political Society* (New York: Random House, 1967), for a discussion of the 'stages' between band and chiefdom.

 7 Note that in our society nationalism requires that the individual's primary allegiance be to the state, not the family or the local community.

 8 Some of the interconnections among these factors are discussed in Marshall Sahlins, *Stone Age Economics* (London: Tavistock, 1974), chapter 2.

 9 Examples of modesty about wealth and success are found in Stanley Diamond, *op. cit.*, n. 3.

10 The concepts of reciprocity, redistribution, and exchange to describe primitive, pre-modern, and modern economies respectively were originally formulated by Karl Polanyi, *op. cit.*, n. 4.

11 The idea that communities can ever be harmonious is a tragic vision according to Glenn Tinder, *Community: Reflections on a Tragic Ideal* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 1981).

12 Even though there was disharmony an individual still felt enveloped by the community. Stanley Diamond, *op. cit.*, n. 3, p. 138.

13 T. Strehlow, *Aranda Traditions* (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1947), pp. 30–1.

14 Frank Speck, 'Penobscot Tales and Religious Beliefs,' *Journal of American Folk-Lore*, 48 (1935), pp. 5–7; and H. Alexander, *The World's Rim* (Lincoln: Nebraska University Press, 1953), p. 89.

15 Ryda Dyson-Hudson and E. Alden Smith, 'Human Territoriality: An Ecological Reassessment,' *American Anthropologist*, 80 (1975), pp. 21–41.

16 Fr. Van Wing, *Etudes Bakongo*, 2nd edn (Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1959), pp. 93–4.

17 See Marshall Sahlins' discussion of economic defendability in his 'The Social Life

of Monkeys, Apes, and Primitive Man,' in J. N. Sphuler (ed.), *The Evolution of Man's Capacity for Culture* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1959), pp. 54–73.

18 Some of these issues seem to lie behind the argument made by Robert Lowie in his *The Origin of the State* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1962) when he attacked Morgan's view that primitive societies are based on social definitions of territory.

19 For a contrast between modern Western and traditional views see the discussions of space in Paul Bohannan, *Africa and Africans* (Garden City, N.Y.: Museum of Natural History, 1964).

20 This distinction between abstract space and space and places filled with content is made by Yi-Fu Tuan, in *Space and Place*, *op. cit.*, n. 1. Indeed the term space may be inappropriate in the setting of primitive society. Space is rather a series of places.

21 For a comparison of pre-modern and modern meaning of time see Lewis Mumford, *op. cit.*, n. 1; and Nigel Thrift, 'Spontaneity or Order: A Social History of Time Consciousness' (unpublished manuscript).

22 Alexander Marshack, *Roots of Civilization* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972).

23 See Edward Relph's discussion of inauthentic places in his *Place and Placelessness* (London: Pion Press, 1976).

24 Anthony Giddens, *op. cit.*, n. 1, uses the term class divided society.

25 For an overall review of theories concerning the transition to civilization see Elman Service, *Origins of the State and Civilization* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975).

26 The example is drawn in part from Service's discussion on pp. 72–83 and the diagram is after Service, p. 77, in Elman Service, *ibid*.

27 The idea is similar to Service's discussion of Chiefly Ramage, *ibid*. p. 80.

28 For pre-capitalist forms such as this see Karl Marx, *Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations* (New York: International Publishers, 1965); and Barry Hindes and Paul Hirst, *Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975).

29 Robert McAdams, *The Evolution of Urban Society: Early Mesopotamia and Prehispanic Mexico* (Chicago: Aldine, 1966), finds several of these forms to pertain to Mesopotamia, see especially pp. 79–119. Yet they all emphasize territorial definitions of social relationships. About the importance of this change and its link to the rise of civilization McAdams says, 'Probably most would also tend to question Morgan's implicit assumption that the substitution of territorially defined communities for ethnically defined ones was both a necessary and a sufficient cause for the growth of the institution of private property. But there can be little dissent with the general shift he posited from ascriptively defined groupings of persons to politically organized units based on residence. And, substituting class stratification for property, I, for one, still share his conviction that it was the "mainspring" and "foundation" of political society' (quoting Morgan, p. 80).

30 See the discussion of how tribal demarcations became administrative areas of Ancient Egypt in Laurence Krader, *Formation of the State* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), pp. 54–5. See also Frederick Engels' discussion of the

formation of Athenian jurisdictions in *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State* (New York: International Publishers, 1972), pp. 176–9.

31 Accurate knowledge of the geography of large holdings and of political boundaries was nothing like it is today. A noble may know only that he owns an estate here and there, and it is the peasants on the estate who know where the particular boundaries of the property end. Political territories were often either defined by such estates or on an empirical level were more like frontier zones than sharply demarcated lines.

32 The order of territorial control in empires was first military, then administrative, then economic according to Michael Mann, 'State, Ancient and Modern,' *Archives Européennes de Sociologie*, 18, no. 2 (1977), pp. 262–98.

33 Joseph Needham and Wang Ling, *Science and Civilization in China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), vol. 2, pp. 279–303. See also Paul Wheatley, *Pivot of the Four Quarters* (Chicago: Aldine, 1971), who discusses the relationship between symbolic geography and political integration. For similar use of symbolism in Andean society see, David Gow, 'Verticality and Andean Cosmology: Quadripartition, Opposition and Mediation,' *Actes du XLIIe Congrès International des Americanistes*, 4 (1978), pp. 194–211.

34 These points about Greek art are made by William Ivins, *Art and Geometry: A Study in Space Intuitions* (New York: Dover Publications, 1964).

35 Max Jammer, *Concepts of Space* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1969), states that space was conceived by classical Greek philosophy and science at first as something 'inhomogeneous . . . and later as something anistropic . . . [and] these doctrines account for the failure of mathematics, especially geometry, to deal with space as a subject of scientific inquiry' (p. 23).

36 O. Neugebauer, *The Exact Sciences in Antiquity* (Providence, Rhode Island: Brown University Press, 1957), p. 225.

37 For a demographic analysis of the foundations of European capitalism see E. Jones, *The European Miracle* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); and for a political historical analysis see Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolute State* (London: N.L.B., 1979).

38 This point is made most forcefully by Robert Brenner, 'The Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism,' *New Left Review*, 104 (1977), pp. 25–92. But it is not the only means by which people become dependent on the market. The New World farmers could have become subsistence farmers if it were not for the fact that they had to pay rent and mortgages in currency, not in kind. British colonialism in Africa forced African farmers into the market by levying taxes on land which had to be paid in money. This meant they had to produce for the market in order to pay the taxes.

39 Robert Brenner, *op. cit.*, n. 38, mentions the peasant farmers in parts of France as examples of those who could fall back on subsistence.

40 See Perry Anderson, *op. cit.*, n. 37, for a review.

41 For an analysis of the role of the state in capitalism, see Gordon Clark and Michael Dear, *State Apparatus: Structures and Language of Legitimacy* (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1984), especially pp. 14–38; and Anthony Giddens, *op. cit.*, n. 1.

42 The history of the concept of progress is found in J. B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress*

(New York: Macmillan, 1932). For a similar discussion of "modern" see Crane Brinton, *The Shaping of the Modern Mind* (New York: Mentor Books, 1953), in which he states that 'Men have always lived in "modern" times but they have not always been as much impressed with the fact. Our own time, conventionally considered as beginning about 1500 A.D., is the first to coin so neat a term and apply it so consistently. Modern derives from a late Latin adverb meaning just now, and in English is found in its current sense, contrasted with ancient, as early as Elizabethan days. The awareness of a shaped newness, of a way of life different from that of ones forebears – and by 1700 awareness of a way of life felt by many to be much better than that of their forebears – this is in itself one of the clearest marks of our modern culture' (p. 19). See also his discussion of the idea of progress in the eighteenth century (p. 120).

43 Charles Trinkaus, 'Introduction: Renaissance and Discovery,' in F. Chiappelli (ed.), *First Images of America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), vol. 1, p. 8.

44 There are of course many characteristics to scientific concepts and to the language of science in general. What is meant here by clarity is described more fully in Robert Sack, *Conceptions of Space in Social Thought: A Geographic Perspective* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980). Remoteness is also discussed there but in terms of the fact that scientific symbols are conventions, selected for their precision and for their significance and represented by symbolic vehicles that have nothing to do with the physical characteristics of the things being conceptualized. Thus a symbol x can stand for mass, y for volume and so on. This clarity of meanings and conventionalism of representation gives scientific symbols and concepts a psychological distance from what they represent. See Alfred Sohn-Rethel, *Intellectual and Manual Labour* (London: Macmillan, 1978) for a discussion of the interrelationships among capitalism, exchange, and abstract space and time.

45 Progress can be thought of as the rationalization of the material changes which capitalism brings about.

46 Nigel Thrift, *op. cit.*, n. 21, discusses the power that abstract time came to have. The difference between modern and pre-modern conceptions of time are discussed by Lewis Mumford, *op. cit.*, n. 1. Again, see Sohn-Rethel, *op. cit.*, n. 44, for an analysis of the relationships among capitalism and abstract space and time.

47 For analyses of large-scale medieval mapping see D. Chitton, 'Land Measurement in the 16th Century,' *Transactions, Newcomen Society*, 30 (1957–9), pp. 111–29; D. J. Price, 'Medieval Land Surveying and Topographical Maps,' *Geographical Journal*, 121 (1955), pp. 1–10; and H. Lyons, 'Ancient Surveying Instruments,' *Geographical Journal*, 69 (1927), pp. 137–43. Grids of some sort were used in a cartographic proposal of Roger Bacon, p. 11 of J. H. Parry, *The Age of Reconnaissance* (New York: World Publishing Co., 1963).

48 S. Edgerton, 'From Mental Matrix to Christian Empire,' in David Woodward (ed.), *Art in Cartography* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, forthcoming).

49 *Ibid.*

50 J. H. Parry, *op. cit.*, n. 47, pp. 53–114.

51 There are, of course, exceptions as in the Inca policy of forest resettlement, and

the Mongols' attempts to remove the Chinese from the steppes, but these were either on a smaller scale or were unsuccessful when compared with North American attempts.

52 For a general discussion of the changing geography of Western cities, see J. Vance, *This Scene of Man* (New York: Harper College Press, 1977); and for the transition to the modern city see David Ward, *Cities and Immigrants* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).

53 Robin Evans, 'Figures, Doors, and Passages,' *Architectural Design*, 48, (1978), pp. 267–78, discusses the interior differentiation of the house.

54 See *ibid.* and Yi-Fu Tuan, *Segmented Worlds*, *op. cit.*, n. 1, for the relationships between architectural segmentation and the development of self-awareness. The language of architecture changed to reflect the concept of emptiable space. Until the modern period, architects designed buildings, now they also construct spaces and volumes. Compare the terms for space in Vitruvius or Alberti to the terms used in a modern book on architecture.

4. The Church

1 The terms visible, physical, or corporeal on the one hand, and invisible and incorporeal on the other, appear throughout discussions of the nature of the Church. See Sheldon Wolin, *Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1960).

2 Romans dedicated Basilicas and Jews dedicated their Temple. Reference to earliest Church consecrations is in Eusebius (His. Eccl. 10:3) wherein he described the dedication for the Basilica of Tyre, 314 A.D. The Catholic ritual for consecrating church buildings was not fully developed until the early Middle Ages.

3 Relics were important components in making places even more sacred. Many churches contained 'relics' of saints and martyrs. See R. W. Southern, *Western Society and the Church of the Middle Ages* (New York: Penguin, 1970), pp. 30–1.

4 The consecration of the church building and the subdivision of the church into gradations of sacred places was inspired by the Biblical descriptions of the Temple. As one Church historian in the seventeenth century put it: 'I hold that it is necessary to distinguish different degrees of holiness between the various parts of a church: and I have no doubt that the altar, for example, is more holy than the rest of the sanctuary; that the sanctuary is holier than the choir; that the choir is holier than the nave; and the nave is holier than the porch': J. G. Davies, *The Secular Use of Church Buildings* (London: S.C.M. Press Ltd, 1968), p. 97, quoting J. B. Thiers' study of church porches. Davies notes further that it is remarkable how close in thought this is to the Jewish Tractate Kelm of the Mishnah which states: 'There are ten degrees of holiness. The Land of Israel is holier than any other land . . . The walled cities are still more holy . . . Within the wall of Jerusalem is still more holy . . . The Court of Women is still more holy . . . The Court of the Israelites is still more holy . . . The Court of Priests is still more holy . . . Between the Porch and the Altar is still more holy, for none that has a blemish or whose hair is unloosed may enter there. The Sanctuary is still more

holy, for none may enter therein with hands and feet unwashed. The Holy of Holies is still more holy, for none may enter therein save only the High Priest on the Day of Atonement' (Davies, pp. 97–8).

5 There always have been Church officials who do not control territory, and there also have been other types of territories and ranks than the ones mentioned. In addition there is a non-territorial arm of control in the Church. For a discussion of Church authority see Stanley Chodorow, *Christian Political Theory and Church Politics in the Mid-12th Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972). For discussion of the structure of the diocese see *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, edited by Catholic University of America (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967–74), vol. 4, under diocese.

6 For a review of the effects of Roman administrative structure on Church organization see A. H. M. Jones, *The Later Roman Empire* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1964), vol. 2, pp. 873–985; for a discussion of a 'wage scale' within the Church, see pp. 904–10. For the general Roman structure see A. Sherwin-White, 'Roman Imperialism,' in J. Balsdon (ed.), *The Romans* (London: C. A. Watts and Co., Ltd, 1965), pp. 76–101. Even before the acceptance of Christianity by Rome, the *curses honorum* had begun. See E. Woodward, *Christianity and Nationalism in the Later Roman Empire* (London: Longman, Green and Co., 1916).

7 R. W. Southern, *op. cit.*, n. 3, especially pp. 56–90.

8 The historical data on the Church are vast and could offer a geographical gold mine of information for the patient scholar. But the data are scattered and incomplete. Categories change and it is difficult to develop even a superficial quantitative description of the system. A quantitative description can be had for certain segments of the Church and in certain regions and times, but these are often not generalizable. For an overview of Church history, see F. Mourett and N. Thompson, *A History of the Catholic Church*, 8 vols. (London: B. Herder Books, 1955).

9 There is a rich literature on the sociology of the Church. Concerning the differences between Church and other types of organizations see, for example, Thomas O. Dea, *The Sociology of Religion* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966). Concerning the organizational dynamics of churches see J. Benson and J. Dorsett, 'Toward a Theory of Religious Organization,' *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 10 (1971), pp. 138–51; J. Fichter, *Religion as an Occupation* (South Bend, Indiana: University of Notre Dame, 1961), especially pp. 263–4 and p. 271 when he discusses the impersonality of the Church structure; C. R. Hinings and B. D. Foster, 'The Organizational Structure of Churches: A Preliminary Model,' *Sociology*, 7–8 (1973–4), pp. 93–106; C. R. Ranson and H. Bryman, 'Churches as Organizations,' in D. S. Pugh and C. R. Hinings, *Organizational Structure: Extensions and Replications* (Westmead: Saxon House, 1976), pp. 102–14; and K. Thompson, *Bureaucracy and Church Reform* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970).

10 There are many lists of Apostles and the names do not always correspond, but for the three most familiar lists, see Luke 6, Mark 3, and Matthew 10.

11 See the references to the Temple in Peter Ackroyed, *Israel Under Babylon* (London: Oxford University Press, 1976); S. Zeithlin, *Studies in the Early History*

of Judaism (New York: Ktav Publishing House, 1973), vol. 1, pp. 143–75; and for a general discussion of Jewish attitudes towards Israel see Robert Cohn, *The Shape of Sacred Space* (Chico, California: Scholar's Press, 1981).

12 For a discussion see Peter Ackroyed, *op. cit.*, n. 11.

13 Ackroyed, *ibid.*, mentions an average of three pilgrims' feasts per year for which people could be expected to make the journey.

14 *Ibid.*, p. 26. By the time of Josiah attempts had been made to centralize all worship in Jerusalem and abolish all other sanctuaries, 2 Kings 22–3.

15 For the origins of the synagogue see K. Kohler, *The Origins of the Synagogue and the Church* (New York: Macmillan, 1929); and S. Sandmel, *Judaism and Christian Beginnings* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), especially pp. 131–2.

16 S. Sandmel, *op. cit.*, n. 15, pp. 131–4. There were other ranks within the Temple including the officers of the Temple, the treasurers and trustees, the controllers of the treasury, and the chief of the high priests.

17 Paul Johnson, *A History of Christianity* (New York: Atheneum, 1979), pp. 16–17; and M. Simon, *Jewish Sects at the Time of Jesus* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967), who says it is doubtful the Essenes had sacrifice.

18 Edwin Hatch, *Early Christian Churches* (London: Longman, 1981).

19 Wayne Meeks, *The First Urban Christians* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), pp. 80–1.

20 See 1 Clement and the letters of Ignatius in Kirsopp Lake, *The Apostolic Fathers* (London: William Heinemann, 1912), vol. 1, especially 1 Clement XLII: 1–5, XLIV: 3; and Ignatius to the Smyrnaeans VII: 1–2, wherein he states: 'See that you all follow the bishop, as Jesus Christ follows the Father, and the presbytery as if it were the Apostles . . . Let no one do any of the things appertaining to the Church without the bishop . . . wherever the bishop appears let the congregation be present.' And in his letter to the Ephesians VII:1 he warns against heretics and about following false and itinerant prophets: 'For there are some who make a practice of carrying about the Name with wicked guile, and do certain other things unworthy of God; there you must shun as wild beasts, for they are ravening dogs, who bite secretly, and you must be upon your guard against them, for they are scarcely to be cured.' He continues in the Magnesians III:1, by equating the bishop with God. 'Now it becomes you . . . to render [the bishop] all respect according to the power of God the Father . . . As then the Lord was united to the Father and did nothing without him . . . so do you nothing without the bishop and the presbyters.'

21 C. J. Hefele, *A History of the Councils of the Church*, trans. by W. R. Clark, 5 vols. (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1895), are voluminous, and often contradictory. According to Hefele, vol. 1, pp. 67–75, the first general collection was by Merling in 1523. Several more were published in the sixteenth century. Hardouin's collection of 1722 and Mansi's of 1759 are widely referred to. There are also numerous regional collections. In the following, for the period up to the ninth century, we will be using the two major English compilations: those of C. J. Hefele and of E. H. Landon, *A Manual of Councils of the Holy Catholic Church*, 2 vols. (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1909). Even these two are not in complete agreement, although they do concur for most of the canons cited. Our wording of

the canons will often be paraphrases of these sources. In order to reduce the number of notes we have omitted references for each canon and its paraphrase. The canons are numbered and dated which allows the reader easily to consult the Landon and Hefele volumes. Since our intention in exploring the canons is to give the flavor and frequency of territorial issues, the precise dates and phrasings are not critical.

22 S. L. Greenslade, 'The Unit of Pastoral Care in the Early Church,' in G. J. Cumings (ed.), *Studies in Church History* (London: T. Nelson, 1965), vol. 2, pp. 102–18, especially pp. 106 and 112; and Ignatius to the Smyrnaeans VIII in Kirsopp Lake, *op. cit.*, n. 20.

23 See Paul's letters to the Corinthians, and Clement's first epistle to the Corinthians, and the letters of Ignatius to the Ephesians, Magnesians, Trallians, and Romans in Kirsopp Lake, *op. cit.*, n. 20.

24 S. L. Greenslade, *op. cit.*, n. 22, p. 106, states that 'I do not know how soon a bishop of any of these [Roman] cities thought of his pastoral care as bounded precisely by the limits of the *territorium* of his *polis*. Ignatius addresses Polycarp as bishop of the *ekklesia* of the Smyrnaeans, a congregational term. Did Polycarp regard himself as responsible for some thirty miles radius round the actual city of Smyrna? Perhaps he had not begun to think like that, but the time soon came when bishops did so envisage their pastoral charge.'

25 C. J. Hefele, *op. cit.*, n. 21, vol. 1.

26 An excellent review of early Christian attitudes towards the Holy Land is found in W. D. Davies, *The Gospel and the Land: Early Christianity and Jewish Territorial Doctrine* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974).

27 J. G. Davies, *op. cit.*, n. 4, p. 4, and quoting St Daniels.

28 J. G. Davies, *op. cit.*, n. 4, p. 10. There are, however, reports of Church ownership before this time. See A. H. M. Jones, *op. cit.*, n. 6, p. 895.

29 J. G. Davies, *op. cit.*, n. 4, p. 9.

30 *Ibid.*, p. 6.

31 C. J. Hefele, *op. cit.*, n. 21, vol. 1, p. 325.

32 A. H. M. Jones, *op. cit.*, n. 6, especially pp. 904–13, especially regarding the bureaucratic facets of the Church. As far as the territorial is concerned, Zeno had declared that there should be one bishop per city, although there were exceptions. For a discussion of the relationships between Church and civic boundaries see C. J. Hefele, *op. cit.*, n. 21, vol. 1, p. 382: 'The Church was not obliged in principle to conform itself to the territorial divisions of the states or of the provinces in establishing its own territorial divisions. If, however, it often accepted these civil divisions as models of its own, it was to facilitate the conduct of business, and to prevent any disruption of received customs. The Apostles often passed through the principal cities of one province for the purposes of preaching the gospel there before entering another, and often . . . they treated the faithful of that province as forming one community.' See also G. W. Addleshaw, *The Beginnings of the Parochial System* (London: St Anthony's Press n.d.) for a discussion of the territorial system in England.

33 J. G. Davies, *op. cit.*, n. 4, quotes one who resisted as saying 'What advantages accrues to him who reaches these celebrated places? He cannot imagine that our

Lord is living, in the body, there at the present day, but has gone away from us foreigners; or that the Holy Spirit is in abundance at Jerusalem, but unable to travel as far as us . . . You who fear the Lord, praise Him in the places where you are now. Change of place does not affect any drawing nearer to God, but wherever you may be, God will come to you' (p. 15).

34 E. H. Landon, *op. cit.*, n. 21, vol. 1, pp. 32–33.

35 C. J. Hefele, *op. cit.*, n. 21, vol. 2, p. 71.

36 E. H. Landon, *op. cit.*, n. 21, vol. 2, p. 126.

37 See discussion of the localization of the eucharist in the parish in *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, *op. cit.*, n. 5, vol. 10, pp. 1018–19.

38 Medieval authorities extended the symolism of the mass to the church building itself. See H. Taylor, *The Medieval Mind* (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd, 1911), pp. 76–104.

39 Pope Galasius 492 A.D. is the turning point according to Gabriel Le Bras, 'The Sociology of the Church in the Early Middle Ages,' in S. L. Thrupp (ed.), *Early Medieval Society* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1967), pp. 47–57.

40 F. Dvornick, *The Ecumenical Councils* (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1961), p. 48.

41 J. McNeill, 'The Feudalization of the Catholic Church,' in J. McNeill (ed.), *Environmental Factors in Christian History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939). For an overview of Medieval Church organization see S. Baldwin, *Organization of Medieval Christianity* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1929). For the detailed case studies of Medieval Church administration see C. R. Cheney, *Episcopal Visitations of Monasteries in the 13th Century* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1931); and R. K. Rose, 'Priests and Patrons in the 14th Century Diocese of Carlisle, in *Studies in Church History* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979), vol. 16, pp. 207–18.

42 J. G. Davies, *op. cit.*, n. 4.

43 R. W. Southern, *op. cit.*, n. 3, p. 38.

44 Paraphrasing R. W. Southern, *ibid.*, p. 102.

45 *Ibid.*, p. 158.

46 Paul Johnson, *op. cit.*, n. 17, p. 273.

47 'Night and day I pondered until I saw the connection between the justice of God and the statement, "righteous shall live by his faith." Then I grasped that the justice of God is that righteousness by which through grace and sheer mercy God justifies us through faith.' Luther quoted in George Mosse, *The Reformation*, 3rd edn (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), p. 25.

48 M. Luther, 'Church and Ministry I,' in E. W. Gritsched (ed.), *Works* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970), vol. 39, p. 219.

49 J. G. Davies, *op. cit.*, n. 4, discusses this on p. 120.

50 M. Luther, 'Treatise in Trade and Usury,' in 'The Christian Society II,' E. W. Gritsched, *op. cit.*, n. 48, vol. 45, p. 286.

51 M. Luther, 'Church and Ministry I,' in *ibid.*, vol. 39, p. 219.

52 M. Luther, 'Trade and Usury,' in 'The Christian Society II,' *ibid.*, vol. 45, p. 286.

53 M. Luther, 'Concerning the Ministry,' in 'Church and Ministry I,' *ibid.*, vol. 40, pp. 7–44.

54 G. Mosse, *op. cit.*, n. 47, pp. 29–31. See also Luther's 'Instructions for the Visitors of Parish Pastors in Electoral Saxony,' *ibid.*, vol. 40; and his 'Temporal Authority: To What Extent Should it be Obeyed,' *ibid.*, vol. 45.

55 M. Luther, 'Ordinance of a Common Chest,' *ibid.*, vol. 45, pp. 169–94.

56 E. G. Leonard, *A History of Protestantism*, trans. by J. Reid (London: Nelson, 1965), p. 114.

57 *The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge*, S. Jackson (ed.) (New York: Funk and Wagnalls Co., 1910).

58 See the *New Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 15th edn (Chicago, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1974), vol. 3, p. 672, for a review of Calvin's Church government.

59 John Calvin, 'Articles Agreed upon by the Faculty of Sacred Theology of Paris with the Antidote,' in Henry Beveridge (trans.), John Calvin, *Tracts and Treatises* (Grand Rapids: Berdmans Publishing Co., 1958), vol. 1, p. 103.

60 John Calvin, 'Ordinances for the Supervision of the Churches in the Country,' in *ibid.*, pp. 223–47.

61 G. Mosse, *op. cit.*, n. 47, p. 71.

62 John Calvin, 'Draft Ecclesiastical Ordinances,' in John Dillenburger (ed.), *John Calvin Selections from His Writings* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1971), p. 233.

63 W. Whittley (ed.), *The Works of John Smythe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1915), p. 252.

64 The Puritan settlements of New England began with intentions of becoming theocracies. Their model of Church government by and large was an English one, and the parish originally played a large part in their organization and definition of community. Yet even they were to exhibit considerable flexibility regarding Church structure and hierarchy, sometimes emphasizing congregational and other times episcopal forms. See L. Bacon, *The Genesis of the New England Churches* (New York: Arno Press, 1972).

65 There is a vast literature on Protestant Church organization that could be examined fruitfully from a geographical perspective. For an overview, see F. E. Mayer, *The Religious Bodies of America* (St Louis, Mo: Concordia Publishing House, 1958); E. S. Mead, *Handbook of Denominations in the United States* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1970); and for particular constitutions see *The Book of Church Order of the Presbyterian Church in the United States* (Richmond, Va; The Board of Christian Education, 1963); E. S. Gaustad (ed.), *Baptists: The Bible, Church Order and the Churches* (New York: Arno Press, 1980); E. S. Gaustad (ed.), *Baptist Ecclesiology* (New York: Arno Press, 1980); N. B. Harmon, *The Organization of the Methodist Church: Historic Development and Present Working Structure* (Nashville: The Methodist Publishing House, 1962); M. Hoffman, *A Treatise on the Law of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States* (New York: Stamford and Swords, 1850); T. B. Neely, *The Bishops and the Supervisional System of the Methodist Episcopal Church* (Cincinnati: Jennings and Graham, 1912); J. M. Tuell, *The Organization of the United Methodist Church* (Nashville: Abingdon Press 1970); *United Church of Christ, History and Program* (Publication Board for Homeland Ministries, n.d.); E. White, *Annotated Constitutions and Canons for the Government of the Protestant*

Episcopal Church in the United States of America (Greenwich, Connecticut: The Seabury Press, 1954), vol. 2.

66 For modern Catholic theological views see Michael Novak, *Confessions of a Catholic* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1983).

67 See references to the Church's activities in South America in the *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, *op. cit.*, n. 5, vol. 9, pp. 945–6. The Treaty of Tordesillas may appear in retrospect to be an abstract clearing of space. The issue is discussed in Chapter 5 of this book.

5. The American territorial system

1 The British had essentially two types of authorized colonies. One was a grant to an individual in the form of a proprietorship or 'fiefdom' and the other was a charter to a corporation. There were unauthorized colonies such as Plymouth and Rhode Island. For discussions of the origins of New World grants and charters, see L. P. Kellog, 'The American Colonial Charter,' *Annual Report of the American Historical Association*, 1 (1903), pp. 185–341; A. Madden, '1066, 1776 and All That: The Relevance of English Medieval Experience of "Empire" to Later Constitutional Issues,' in J. Flint and G. Williams (eds.), *Perspectives of Empire* (London: Longman, 1973), pp. 9–26. For a discussion of Palatinates see, G. T. Lapsley, *The Country Palatine of Durham: A Study in Constitutional History* (New York: Longman, Green and Co., 1900); and J. Scammell, 'The Origins and Limitations of the Liberty of Durham,' *English Historical Review*, 80 (1966), pp. 449–73.

2 For a review of medieval cadasters and surveying techniques, see D. J. Price, 'Medieval Land Surveying and Topographical Maps,' *Geographical Journal*, 121 (1955), pp. 1–10.

3 T-O maps are discussed in Norman Thrower, *Maps and Man* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972), pp. 32–4. See also Lloyd A. Brown, *The Story of Maps* (New York: Bonanza Books, 1949), pp. 94–100.

4 Longitude and latitude took time to become implemented. It was not until the seventeenth century that movable time pieces made accurate measures of longitude possible. See J. H. Parry, *The Age of Reconnaissance* (New York: World Publishing Co., 1963), pp. 97–8.

5 Joseph Needham and Wang Ling, *Science and Civilization in China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), vol. 2, pp. 279–303.

6 See James Carder, *Art Historical Problems of a Roman Land Surveying Manuscript* (New York: Garland, 1978); and P. Mackrindick, 'Roman Colonization and the Frontier Hypothesis,' in W. Wyman and C. Kroeber (eds.), *The Frontier in Perspective* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1957), pp. 3–20.

7 Edmund Burke's concept of virtual representation is found in his letter to Sir Hercules Langrishe, *Works of the Right Honorable Edmund Burke* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1871), vol. 4, p. 293. A general analysis of the meanings of representation is found in H. F. Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967). For reviews of systems of 'representation' before the modern era see J. R. Pole, *Political Representation in England and the*

Origins of the American Republic (New York: St Martins Press, 1966); D. Lutz, 'The Theory of Consent in Early State Constitutions,' *Publius*, 9 (1979), pp. 11–42; and George Sabine, *A History of Political Theory* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), especially pp. 206–301. R. MacIver, *The Modern State* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 141–2, argues that representation as we know it had no real antecedents. The concept of organic community or *Gemeinschaft* (though not of organic representation) is discussed by F. Tonnies, *Community and Society* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1957). The distinction between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* can be traced from Durkheim back to Plato. *Gemeinschaft* or organic community is suggested by organic representation while the community of convenience, the *Gesellschaft*, is suggested by proportional representation.

8 Translations of the documents can be found in Henry Steele Commager (ed.), *Documents of American History* (New York: F. S. Crofts and Co., 1935), pp. 2–5.

9 See the discussion of Donation in L. Weckmann-Munoz, 'The Alexandrine Bulls of 1493,' in F. Chiappelli (ed.), *First Images of America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), vol. 1, pp. 201–9.

10 This, despite the fact that Columbus reports citing naked peoples and the Pope refers to them in the Treaty.

11 Henry Steele Commager, *op. cit.*, n. 8, p. 5. For a slightly different version see F. N. Thorpe (ed.), *The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1909), vol. 1, pp. 45–6.

12 F. N. Thorpe, *op. cit.*, n. 11, vol. 1, p. 54.

13 John Smith quoted in Francis Jennings, *The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1976), p. 78.

14 Purchase quoted in Francis Jennings, *ibid.*, p. 80.

15 *Ibid.*, p. 80. For more detail on attitude toward savages and their rights to land see Etienne Grisel, 'The Beginnings of International Law and General Public Law Doctrine,' in F. Chiappelli, *op. cit.*, n. 9, vol. 1, pp. 305–25; and W. Washburn, 'The Moral and Legal Justification for Dispossessing the Indians,' in J. Smith, *Seventeenth Century America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959), pp. 15–32. Many found the attitude towards the 'savages' hypocritical. Montaigne said 'I find that there is nothing barbarous and savage in this nation, by anything that I can gather, excepting, that every one gives the title, barbarism, to everything that is not in use in his own country.' Michel Montaigne, *Essays of Montaigne* (London: Reeves and Turner, 1902), vol. 1, p. 241.

16 The Dutch West India Co. had been chartered as a commercial monopoly with semi-sovereign powers but without a grant of territory. The charter is found in A. J. F. Van Laer (ed.), *Van Renselaer Boweir Manuscripts* (Albany, N.Y.: N.Y. State Library, 90th Annual Report II, 1908), pp. 86–125.

17 N. Carmey, 'The Ideology of English Colonization: From Ireland to America,' *William and Mary Quarterly*, ser. xxx (1975), pp. 575–98.

18 A. Slavin, 'The American Principles From More to Locke,' in F. Chiappelli, *op. cit.*, n. 9, vol. 1, p. 139.

19 Roger Williams, paraphrased and quoted by William Cronon, *Changes in the*

Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England (New York: Hill and Wang, 1983), p. 57.

20 Francis Jennings, *op. cit.*, n. 13, p. 82, paraphrasing Winthrop.

21 William Cronon, *op. cit.*, n. 19, pp. 56–7, quoting Cotton. Later Massachusetts law did allow Indians to retain cultivated land.

22 Francis Jennings, *op. cit.*, n. 13, p. 60, quoting Marshall. Settling, clearing, planting, and in general introducing any type of capital investment has been, and still is, called an 'improvement' or 'development.' Housing contractors are called 'developers.'

23 F. N. Thorpe, *op. cit.*, n. 11, vol. 7, p. 3795.

24 S. Kingsley, *Records of the Virginia Company* (Library of Congress, 1906–35), vol. 3.

25 F. N. Thorpe, *op. cit.*, n. 11, vol. 1, pp. 69–70.

26 *Ibid.*, vol. 5, pp. 2754–5.

27 *Ibid.*, vol. 6, p. 3215.

28 *Ibid.*, vol. 3, p. 1632.

29 *Ibid.*, vol. 5, p. 2538.

30 *Ibid.*, vol. 5, p. 2574.

31 *Ibid.*, vol. 5, pp. 3036–40 (author's emphasis).

32 *Ibid.*, vol. 5, p. 2772.

33 Marshall Harris, *Origin of the Land Tenure System in the United States* (Ames: Iowa State College Press, 1953), pp. 37–8.

34 Harry Wright (ed.), *Indian Deeds of Hampden County, Massachusetts* (Springfield, Massachusetts, 1905), p. 11.

35 Amelia Ford, *Colonial Precedents of Our National Land System as It Existed in 1800* (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1910), pp. 29–30, referring to Journals of the House of Representatives of Massachusetts Bay, 1715, p. 30.

36 See a description of Penn's grant in Marshall Harris, *op. cit.*, n. 33, p. 240. For a general discussion of early North American surveying and mapping see M. Eggleston, 'The Land System of the New England Colonies,' *The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science Series*, 4, (Baltimore, 1886), p. 22; W. D. Pattison, *Beginnings of the American Rectangular Land Survey System, 1784–1800* (Chicago: Department of Geography, Resource Paper no. 50, 1957), especially p. 64; and N. J. Thrower, *Original Survey and Land Subdivisions: A Comparative Study of the Form and Effect of Contrasting Cadastral Surveys* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967).

37 Amelia Ford, *op. cit.*, n. 35, p. 30.

38 Marshall Harris, *op. cit.*, n. 33, pp. 338–9.

39 Harry Wright, *op. cit.*, n. 34, also referred to in William Cronon, *op. cit.*, n. 19, pp. 74–5.

40 Constantia Maxwell, *Irish History from Contemporary Sources (1509–1610)* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1923), especially pp. 37, 279, and 281; and D. B. Quinn, *The Elizabethans and the Irish* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966).

41 See, for example, Captain Nicholas Pynnar's survey.

42 'By the King, a Project of the Division and Plantation of the Escheated Lands in Six Several Counties in Ulster, Namely Tyrone, Coleraine, Donegal, Ferman-

agh, Armagh, and Cavan,' in Walter Harris, *Hibernica; Or, Some Ancient Pieces Relating to Ireland* (Dublin: John Milliken, 1770), p. 105.

43 *Ibid.*, p. 107.

44 *Ibid.*, pp. 123–38, quotations pp. 135–6.

45 *Ibid.*, pp. 140–3.

46 *Ibid.*, pp. 140–3. Amelia Ford, *op. cit.*, n. 35, p. 2, mentions the relatively abstract layouts by Petty.

47 Calendar of Fiants, Edward VI, no. 724; Eliz. no. 474, contained in the 8th and 11th Reports of the Keeper of the Public Records of Ireland, and contained in House of Commons, 1878–9, vol. 39 and House of Commons, 1876, vol. 39.

48 This experiment is in a sense a non-metrical equivalent of the distance interaction concept in geography. See the discussion of spatial analysis in Chapter 1 of this book.

49 For a discussion of these matters in the Cambridge Platform, see *Creeds and Platforms of Congregationalism* (Boston: The Pilgrim Press, 1893 and 1960). See also John Cotton, *The Way of the Churches in New England* (London, 1645), pp. 109–10.

50 Robert Kingdon, 'Protestant Parishes in the Old World and New: The Cases of Geneva and Boston,' *Church History*, 48 (1979), pp. 290–304.

51 Robert Kelso, *The History of the Public Poor Relief in Massachusetts: 1620–1920* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Company, 1922), p. 36.

52 *Ibid.*, p. 38.

53 *Records of the Colony of New Plymouth in New England*, D. Pulsifer (ed.), vol. 7, *Laws: 1623–1682* (Boston: William White, 1861), p. 118.

54 Second Report of the Record Commissioners, City of Boston, Document 46–1881 (Boston Town Records, 1634–60); also Robert Kelso, *op. cit.*, n. 51.

55 Robert Kelso, *op. cit.*, n. 51, p. 41.

56 *Ibid.*, pp. 41–2.

57 *Ibid.*, p. 46.

58 *Ibid.*, p. 59.

59 D. T. Fiske, 'Discourse Relating to the Churches . . . of Essex North,' in *Contributions to the Ecclesiastical History of Essex County, Massachusetts* (prepared and published under the direction of the Essex North Association of Boston: Congregational Board of Publications, 1865), p. 263; *Massachusetts Historical Collections*, vol. 1, p. 216, and vol. 3, p. 78.

60 Resource is a relatively new term. The *O.E.D.* cites its first appearance in 1611.

61 For a discussion of the commercialization of land and its effects on colonial land use practices see William Cronon, *op. cit.*, n. 19, p. 75.

62 Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Great Books, 1952).

63 Jean Bodin, *Six Books of the Commonwealth* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1955), p. 30.

64 John Milton, *Prose Work* (London: Everyman's Library, 1958), pp. 233–42; and David Hume, T. H. Greene, and T. H. Grose (eds.), *Essays Moral, Political, and Literary* (New York: Longman, Green and Co., 1898), vol. 1, pp. 482–93.

65 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Political Writings* (New York: Nelson, 1953).

66 Samuel Huntington, 'The Founding Fathers and the Division of Powers,' in

Arthur Maass (ed.), *Area and Power* (Illinois: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 150–205.

67 C. Kenyon (ed.), *The Antifederalists* (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1966).

68 James Madison in M. Farrand (ed.), *The Records of the Federal Convention*, 3 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1911), vol. 2, p. 124. This follows the statement that class should be represented as is the case with geographical communities.

69 *Federalist*, no. 10.

70 James Madison, in G. Hunt (ed.), *Writings*, 9 vols. (New York: G. Putnam and Sons, 1900–1), vol. 5, p. 31. On factions and territory, see vol. 9, pp. 524–5; and in vol. 6, after discussing the virtues of the partition of powers among legislative, judicial and executive, he adds: 'the political system of the U.S. claims still higher praise. The power delegated by the people is first divided between the general government and the state governments; each of which is then subdivided into legislative, executive, and judiciary departments . . . [This] may prove the best legacy ever left by lawgivers to their country' (pp. 91–2). And in vol. 9 he asks: 'Into how many parts must Virginia be split before the semblance of such a condition [homogeneity of interests] could be found . . . in the smallest of the fragments, there would soon be added to previous sources of discord a manufacturing and an agricultural class . . .?' (p. 526).

71 Roy Honeywell, *The Educational Works of Thomas Jefferson* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1931), especially chapter 2.

72 Thomas Jefferson, *Writings*, 20 vols., Andrew Lipscomb (ed.), (Washington, D.C.: The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1903–4), vol. 2, p. 122, cited in Samuel Huntington, *op. cit.*, n. 66, p. 175.

73 Donald Lutz, *op. cit.*, n. 7. This of course did not mean that franchise was universal. See also J. Pole, *Political Representation in England and the Origins of the American Republic* (London: Macmillan, 1966), especially pp. 127 and 385; and G. Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969), p. 172.

74 This may have been due to the fact that no one knew which states would ratify the Constitution.

75 Max Farrand, *The Legislations of Congress for the Government of the Organized Territories of the United States: 1789–1895* (Newark, N.J.: Wm A. Baker, 1896).

76 *Federalist*, no. 17. See also *Federalist*, no. 45.

77 Kenneth Winkle, 'The Politics of Community: Migration and Politics in Antebellum Ohio' (Madison: University of Wisconsin, Ph.D. thesis, 1984).

78 De Tocqueville comments frequently about the mobility of Americans.

79 It is more precise to say that they would agree if they were made aware of these effects, because many theorists ignore space and territory completely. They operate as though political economic activities occur in a geographical vacuum.

80 Adam Smith recognized the need for government to provide public goods. In this respect he seems more 'liberal' than are some American conservative politicians who leave virtually no room at all for the role of government.

81 The definition of pure public good is taken largely from Robert Bennett, *The Geography of Public Finance* (London: Methuen, 1980), pp. 11–13, but draws

also upon Paul Samuelson, 'The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure,' *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 36 (1954), pp. 387–9.

82 Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965).

83 Kevin Cox, *Conflict, Power and Politics in the City: A Geographic View* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973), p. 3; and Gordon Tullock, *Toward a Mathematics of Politics* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967), pp. 82–3.

84 Kevin Cox, *op. cit.*, n. 83, pp. 10–11.

85 Robert Bennett, *op. cit.*, n. 81, pp. 64–5. What is more, neo-Keynesians have warned that territory can often be an end in itself. Aid is given to places which become surrogates for people. See M. Edel, ' "People" Versus "Places" in Urban Impact Analysis,' in N. Gluckman (ed.), *The Urban Impact of Federal Policies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), pp. 175–91.

86 Gordon Clark and Michael Dear, *State Apparatus: Structures and Language of Legitimacy* (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1984), especially chapter 2.

87 This is a generalization of course because there are other names for these levels as well as other levels altogether.

88 Precisely what the role of the state is in capitalism has not been worked out. See Gordon Clark and Michael Dear, *op. cit.*, n. 86, especially chapter 2 for a review of the topic.

89 Gordon Clark, 'Towards a Critique of the Tiebout Hypothesis,' in A. Burnett and P. Taylor (eds.), *Political Studies from Spatial Perspectives* (New York: John Wiley, 1981), pp. 111–30; C. Tiebout, 'A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,' *Journal of Political Economy*, no. 64 (1956), pp. 416–24. See also Ivan Szelenyi, 'The Relative Autonomy of the State or State Mode of Production,' in Michael Dear and Allen Scott (eds.), *Urbanization and Urban Planning in Capitalist Society* (New York: Methuen, 1981), pp. 565–91.

90 Richard Peet, 'Inequality and Poverty: A Marxist-Geographic Inquiry,' *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 65 (1975), pp. 564–71.

91 J. O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1973).

92 Kevin Cox, *Urbanization and Conflict in Market Societies* (Chicago: Maroufa Press, 1978), p. 84; and Ron Johnston, 'The Local State and the Judiciary,' in Robin Flowerdew (ed.), *Institutions and Geographic Patterns* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1982), especially p. 263.

93 Gordon Clark, 'The Law, the State, and the Spatial Integration of the United States,' *Environment and Planning A*, 13 (1981), pp. 1197–1232. Ref. on p. 1198.

94 *Ibid.*

95 *Ibid.*, p. 1212.

96 *Ibid.*, p. 1215.

97 A major use of territory in contemporary political organizations which is not addressed by any particular political theory but which follows from the theory of territoriality is the division of decision making into long and short range planning and responsibility and its association with levels of political territories. Many decisions in government use territory to divide the process into stages and levels.

A plan can be formulated, approved, and funded at the national level, and then implemented and further funded at the state or local level. This is the case, for example, with nuclear power. The research, development, and national priorities

were established before the geographic details at the local level were worked out. By the time implemention was addressed there were few options left for the local units. The effect of such a process is to make the geographic impact precise at one level – the national – and to leave it imprecise or even undefined at another – the local – until much later when the process must be located elsewhere. To say the least, this procedure allows decisions to be made which might be strongly resisted at the local level.

6. The work place

1 Lyn Lofland, *A World of Strangers* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), pp. 30–2.

2 For the relationships between personal identity and geographical segmentation see Yi-Fu Tuan, *Segmented Worlds and Self* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982).

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50 Robin Evans, 'Figures, Doors, and Passages,' *Architectural Design*, 48 (1978), pp. 267–78. See Robin Evans, 'Rookeries and Model Dwellings,' *Architectural Association Quarterly*, 10 (1978), pp. 24–35 for a discussion of internal partitioning of houses for the poor as an instrument of reform. For the elaborate partitioning of the upper class Victorian house, see Mark Girouard, *The Victorian Country House* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971).

51 Giedion, *op. cit.*, n. 40, p. 363.

52 *Ibid.*, p. 378.

53 *Ibid.*, pp. 405 and 582.

54 Kitchens were often presented as little factories in which food was produced.

55 A classic review of the domestic system is found in Paul Mantoux, *The Industrial Revolution in the Eighteenth Century*, revised edn, and trans. by Marjorie Vernon (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1962). The system has also been called the putting·out system when the cottager is linked to a merchant supplier who pays the cottager wages for work.

56 The freedom of the domestic worker should not be exaggerated. It was relative to the factory. The cottager may have had to work long hours, under hardships, and for little pay, but he could still pace his own work within the week and have a say in how his tasks would be organized.

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67 See Derek Gregory, *op. cit.*, n. 57, for a discussion of the various interests in and forms of resistance to the factory system in the Yorkshire woolen industry.

68 Paul Mantoux, *op. cit.*, n. 57, p. 35.

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70 G. Unwin, *Samuel Oldknow and the Arkwrights* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1924), pp. 34–5, citing acts of 1777 of the West Riding, and later acts of 1784, 1785, and 1790 for other areas. 'There was not much left of the independence of the small master except the choice of his hours of labour . . .' (p. 35).

71 John Prest, *The Industrial Revolution in Coventry* (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 45.

72 *Ibid.*, p. 96.

73 See Parliamentary Papers on the factory and Karl Marx.

74 Harry Braverman, *Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974), p. 66.

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79 Harry Braverman, *op. cit.*, n. 74, pp. 65–6.

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93 Several of the studies cited above suggest that there is a point where too much complexity and discretion in tasks can create worker dissatisfaction. See also n. 100.

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Introduction

Human territoriality is a powerful and pervasive element in our lives, but serious scholarship has only skirted its perimeters. This book attempts to help redirect research towards the core of territoriality by conceiving of it as an often indispensable means to power at all levels: from the personal to the international. Since the subject is vast and the uses of territoriality so varied, I can do no more in a single volume than offer a sketch and hope that the picture will serve to stimulate further research. In order to prepare the reader for the approach taken in this book, I would like to say a few words about the contexts in which I think a fruitful discussion of territoriality does and does not belong.

Perhaps the most well-publicized statements on human territoriality have come from biologists and social critics who conceive of it as an offshoot of animal behavior. These writers argue that territoriality in humans is part of an aggressive instinct that is shared with other territorial animals. The view presented in this book is quite different. Although I see territoriality as a basis of power, I do not see it as part of an instinct, nor do I see power as essentially aggressive. The power that a parent exercises over a child may be for the child's good, and that power may or may not be territorial. A parent may decide it is safer to keep the child indoors and away from the wet and cold of the rain. Keeping the child at home, as we shall see, is a territorial restraint. It may be a convenient strategy, but it is not the only means of keeping the child warm and dry. The parent could allow the child to play outside if he is well bundled up in warm rain gear.

Humans can use territoriality for a variety of often abstract reasons, few if any of which are motivations for animals. In fact, because territoriality in humans supposes a control over an area or space that must be conceived of and communicated, one can argue that territoriality in this sense is quite unlikely in most if not all animals. Territoriality in humans is best understood as a spatial strategy to affect, influence, or control resources and people, by controlling area; and, as a strategy, territoriality can be turned on

and off. In geographical terms it is a form of spatial behavior. The issue then is to find out under what conditions and why terrioriality is or is not employed.

This book will examine human territoriality in the context of human motivation. But there remains the fact that the popular image of territoriality is drawn from works emphasizing biological links. Thus the efforts at drawing attention away from such a connection can be confounded by using a term that connotes them. Despite such drawbacks to the term territoriality (and that it is not a pretty sounding word), I have not been able to find a better one. Sovereignty, property, and jurisdiction are too restricted in scope to be suitable alternatives. Although an awkward term, I will use territoriality and trust that its former connotations will not draw attention away from what I believe to be its true signification: *a human strategy to affect, influence, and control.*

Territoriality in humans is best thought of not as biologically motivated, but rather as socially and geographically rooted. Its use depends on who is influencing and controlling whom and on the geographical contexts of place, space, and time. Territoriality is intimately related to how people use the land, how they organize themselves in space, and how they give meaning to place. Clearly these relationships change, and the best means of studying them is to reveal their changing character over time. Territoriality thus lies squarely within two geographical traditions: social geography and historical geography. We can of course claim that these are really interconnected and form a single approach – a social–historical one. Whereas few would deny that the two should be linked, and some have been able to incorporate both traditions in their work, it is not easy to combine both to everyone's satisfaction. The problem centers on the complex differences between the particularistic approaches of historical geography and the generalizing approaches of social geography and its theoretical component – spatial analysis. The differences between the particular and the general are confronted over again in the rest of social science.

Historical geography, which is closely allied with history, tends to undertake detailed examinations of places at certain periods. It may employ generalizations from social geography and other social sciences and it may arrive at general descriptions of people and society, but its primary focus is an understanding of the particular relationships that pertained at a particular place during a particular period. It is often 'long' on facts and descriptions, but 'short' on theory. In terms of the philosophy of geography, it tends to be 'ideographic.' Social geography (and its most generalizing component – spatial analysis), on the other hand, is closely allied to such systematic social sciences as economics, sociology, and political science, and tends to form abstract models of social–geographical relations and to test them usually in contemporary settings, though occasionally data from the past are

used. In geographic terminology these approaches are called 'nomothetic.'

Clearly these can be conceived of as forming a continuum, and thus they need not in principle represent very different approaches. History and historical geography can use socal theories and help reformulate them, and social theories can be made more precise and pertinent under the scrutiny of historians. Yet in practice – due perhaps to personal preferences in research, to styles of analysis, to gaps between fact and theory – the continuum has been a bit thin in the middle. Historians and historical geographers often criticize systematic social science models as a-historical and claim that when the models are tested on the past, we learn very little about the period because these over-generalized models, rather than the historical contexts, select the facts to be explained. Social geographers and social scientists counter that many historical geographers and historians are too unwilling to generalize and to accept the fact that even detailed descriptions must be based on generalizations about behavior and about the past. And of course, when one tries to bridge these differences by practicing in the middle of the continuum, one runs the risk of not satisfying either end.

So it is within the tradition of human geography, and somewhere between the traditions of social and historical analysis, that this work on territoriality lies. The following contains both theory and history with perhaps a heavier emphasis on the former because my training has been in the spatial-analytic part of social geography. By theory I do not mean the full-blown positivistic conception of a series of nomothetic relationships linked together axiomatically and which can be used to predict human actions. Rather by theory I mean an interrelated group of characteristics which can be used to explain or make sense of behavior. This more flexible meaning is intended to suggest less than the positivistic ideal, but more than just some loosely connected notions. An important characteristic of territorial theory is that it is designed to disclose potential reasons for using territoriality. Which ones are used in fact depend on the actual context. Some of the reasons or effects will be used in practically any situation, and others will be used only under particular contexts. In this respect, the theory is phrased generally or abstractly drawing on social structure, but its specification and exemplification depends on particular historical context and on individual agency. The purpose of the book is not simply to test, exemplify, or illustrate generalizations. It is hoped that the book will also deepen our understanding of certain historical contexts by demonstrating how and why territoriality is used. Territoriality can shed light especially on the rise of civilization and on critical facets of modernity.

Territoriality then is an historically sensitive use of space, especially since it is socially constructed and depends on who is controlling whom and why. It is the key geographical component in understanding how society and space are interconnected. In exploring these issues, the book not only uses the past

to illustrate the theory but also reconstructs parts of the history of territoriality in order to shed more light on past and present social organizations. But in combining theory and history, the book makes no pretense at disclosing new historical facts or sources. Rather it attempts to place old and well-known facts in a different light.

1

The meaning of territoriality

Territoriality for humans is a powerful geographic strategy to control people and things by controlling area. Political territories and private ownership of land may be its most familiar forms but territoriality occurs to varying degrees in numerous social contexts. It is used in everyday relationships and in complex organizations. Territoriality is a primary geographical expression of social power. It is the means by which space and society are interrelated. Territoriality's changing functions help us to understand the historical relationships between society, space, and time.

This book explores some of the more important changes that have occurred in the relationships between society and territoriality, from the beginning of history to the present. It does so by analyzing the possible advantages and disadvantages that territoriality can provide, and considering why some and not others arise only at historical periods. Exploring the advantages and disadvantages leads us to the theory of territoriality. Exploring when and why these come to the fore constitutes the history of territoriality and its changing relationships to space and society.

The history of territoriality and territoriality's relationship to space and society are informed by the theoretically possible advantages that territoriality can be expected to provide. After introducing the meaning of territoriality in this chapter we will explore in Chapter 2 the theoretically possible advantages of territoriality. The subsequent chapters will consider how and when these advantages are used historically and the effects they have on social organization. Chapter 3 will sketch the major changes in the relationships between territory and society from primitive times to the present and focus on the most important periods: the rise of civilization and the rise of capitalism. Chapter 4 will analyze the pre-modern development of territoriality within a complex organization – the Catholic Church. Chapters 5 and 6 will consider the development of territoriality in the modern period: Chapter 5 will explore the rise of the four-hundred-year-old political territorial organization of North America; Chapter 6 will explore the